AUTHORITY- ALTHOUGH
LAW- REMEDIAL
HAVING BROAD DISCRETION TO FASHION SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
ORDERS, IMPLEMENTING A REMEDIAL DECREE AIMED AT MAKING
THE VIOLATING DISTRICT MORE ATTRACTIVE TO STUDENTS IN
SURROUNDING SUBURBS EQUALED AN INTERDISTRICT SOLUTION
WHICH IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERDISTRICT VIOLATION
EXCEEDED THE REMEDIAL AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT-

CONSTITUTIONAL

Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
The essentially contradictory phrase of "separate but equal" developed by the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson' at one

time made segregated education not only possible but mandatory, and has
left lasting effects on the public school systems of the United States. 2
Segregated school districts were not officially declared unconstitutional
until fifty-eight years later when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1)3 declared separate but equal to be inherently unequal. 4 Overruling Plessy did not solve the problems associated with seg163 U.S. 537 (1896)
2 See Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the Rehnquist Court's Commitment to Color- Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (1996).
Plessy v. Ferguson held that providing separate facilities for the different races did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Plessy, 163 U.S.
at 548. The Court reasoned that under the "separate but equal" doctrine no Fourteenth
Amendment violation would be found if the states maintained substantially equal facilities,
even though these facilities would be separate. See id. at 546-47. As a result, a dual
school system developed that permitted white schools to deny entrance to black students.
See id. at 544; Chelsey Parkman, Note, Missouri v. Jenkins: The Beginning of the End
for Desegregation, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 715, 721 (1996). Blacks were not equally educated under this system of separate facilities. See Parkman, supra, at 721-22 (noting that
black students attended deteriorating schools that were receiving only a portion of the
funds used to educate white students, were located miles away without their students receiving the benefit of bus transportation enjoyed by white students, and were equipped to
provide instruction in only the basic disciplines).
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (hereinafter Brown 1).
4 See id. at 495. In Brown I, the Supreme Court held that official segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.; infra note 26
(setting forth the relevant text of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Brown I Court concluded that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no
place." Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495. The Court specifically noted "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal." Id. This language overruled the Plessy Court's support of the "separate but equal" doctrine. See id. at 494-95. The holding in Brown I was
based on findings that dual school systems had intangible effects on black students and
also adversely affected their "hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id.
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regated education and merely served as the genesis of a lengthy and complex process, the end result of which was to have black and white chil-

dren educated together in schools that were not racially identifiable. 5
Initiating the first desegregation programs was a slow process due to resistance from states and local school districts to court orders, minimal

leadership from state legislatures, and a lack of meaningful initiative from
the courts. 6 Supreme Court involvement resulted from this leisurely
movement toward unitary7 school system status! Additionally, Congress
at 493-94. For additional discussion of Brown I see infra note 45. Subsequently, the
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I1), which addressed the best methods of implementing and enforcing federal court judgments requiring the elimination of
segregatory school systems. See Brown 11, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955); infra notes 44-52
and accompanying text for a thorough treatment of the holding of Brown II.
5 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board
of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
547, 548-49 (1995) (proposing that Brown 1 failed to have much impact on areas outside
of school desegregation and even less effect than hoped in that area); see also Robert F.
Drinan, S.J., Civil Rights-The Next Thirty Years, 29 U.S.F. L. R.Ev. 875, 877 (1995)
(commenting that Brown 1, although considered to have bridged the chasm between the
races, did not serve as a decision that freed African-Americans from the last remains of
slavery); Carter M. Stewart & S. Felicita Torres, Recent Development, Limiting Federal
Court Power to Impose School Desegregation Remedies, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
241, 243 (1996) (declaring that the anticipated transformation in school policy emanating
from Brown was slow to emerge).
6 See Stewart & Torres, supra note 5, at 243. Segregated school systems took advantage of the tepid standard set forth in Brown 1I to "make a prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance," often implementing no new policies. Id.; see, e.g., Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1968) (continuing segregatory practices even
after the Brown decisions); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S.
225, 228 (1969) (criticizing local school boards for failing to take any effective steps to
bring about desegregation in the public school system for the 10-year period after Brown
I).
" When referring to school systems affected by segregatory practices, the courts
have utilized "dual" to describe a school district which has participated in de jure segregation by race, and "unitary" to denote a school district which has rectified the violation
and is currently adhering to constitutional provisions. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237, 246 (1991); Brian K. Landsberg, Equal Educational Opportunity: The
Rehnquist Court Revisits Green and Swann, 42 EMORY L.J. 821, 825-26 (1993) (noting
that a dual system has definite black and white components, while a unitary system is
non-racial); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992) (recognizing that although the
term "unitary district" is incapable of fixed meaning, it is often defined as a district that is
complying with constitutional requirements); Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School
Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious
Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1990) (explaining that unitary
status is not to be considered by looking at a particular moment in time but, rather, is a
"general state of being").
" See, e.g., Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring that the desegregation process
move forward "with all deliberate speed"); Copper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15 (1958)
(speaking out against the known and intense resistance to the Brown I1ruling in the
South); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963) (expressing impatience with the
lag in implementing Brown 1I); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)
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was frustrated with the delays associated with the integration process and
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9

The desegregation process has been accomplished successfully in the
rural areas and small towns of the South, but metropolitan areas nation-

wide continue to remain predominantly black." The opportunity to easily
desegregate schools was present years ago when cities and their respective school districts were not so racially identifiable." This has long
since passed and the district courts currently dealing with segregated

school systems 2 are commonly faced with demographic population shifts

(declaring that in the face of a decade of inaction "[tihe time for mere 'deliberate speed'
has run out"); Green, 391 U.S. at 439 (abandoning the deliberate speed standard and
stressing that a plan must be implemented that "promises realistically to work now"); see
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-18, at 1489-90 (2d ed.
1988) for a more detailed discussion of the Court's impatience with the slow implementation of desegregation policies in dual school systems. Judicial intervention was necessary
in these instances because even with all the faults associated with school desegregation
adjudication, it was not possible to imagine a constitutional system where none of the
branches of government were prepared to proclaim and enforce constitutional rights. See
Howard I. Kalodner, Overview of JudicialActivism in Education Litigation, in JUSTICE
AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS:
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATION LITIGATION 3, 3
(Barbara Flicker ed., 1990)
9 See TRIBE, supra note 8, § 16-18, at 1490 n.21. The Court's action in Brown and
in subsequent cases exposing racial injustice helped to instigate the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. J. Skelly Wright, Public School Desegregation:Legal Remedies for
De Facto Segregation, in DE FACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS: STRUGGLE FOR
LEGAL AND SOCIAL EQUA11TY 4, 25 (Oliver Schroeder, Jr. & David T. Smith eds., 1965);

Green, 391 U.S. at 433 n.2; for a thorough treatment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act see
LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 46-58 (1976); see also Barbara Flicker, The View from the Bench: Judges in
Desegregation Cases, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
EDUCATION LITIGATION 365, 370 (Barbara Flickered., 1990) (noting that although actions

taken by the executive and legislative branches of government helped many remedial
plans to succeed, the Supreme Court provided the impetus which propelled the district
courts). The 1964 Act required school districts to initiate good faith attempts to desegregate by delineating specific guidelines and by empowering the government to refuse federal contributions to school districts that continued to discriminate against blacks. See
Stewart & Torres, supra note 5, at 244 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-6, 2000d-1 (1988);
see generally James R. Dunn, Title Vi, the Guidelines and School Desegregation in the
South, 53 VA. L. REV. 42 (1967); School Desegregation and the Office of Education
Guidelines, Note, 55 GEO. L.J. 325 (1966); The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, Comment, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967).
'0See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan
Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 826 (1996); see also Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 5,
at 549 (discussing that many critics have claimed that Brown I had a relatively minimal
impact in desegregating public schools except in the Deep South).
11 See, e.g., JoAnn Grozuczak Goedert, Comment, Jenkins v. Missouri: The Future
of InterdistrictSchool Desegregation, 76 GEO. L.J. 1867, 1867 (1988).
2 See, e.g., id. Although it is difficult to approximate the number of school districts
actively involved in litigation concerning their constitutional obligation to desegregate officially segregated public schools, a conservative estimate is in the hundreds. See Daniel
J. McMullen & Irene Hirata. McMullen, Stubborn Facts of History-The Vestiges of Past
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tending to leave the inner-city school districts predominantly black and
the surrounding suburban school districts predominantly white." Further
judicial involvement is necessary in these instances; however, the remedial process is complicated by questions regarding the scope of a district
court's power to remedy past instances of de jure segregation crossing
school district lines.14 To achieve an effective remedy, it would seem
that a desegregation plan crossing district borders would be both necessary and the most effective way to remove the racial identifiableness of
Discriminationin School Desegregation Cases, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 75, 76 (1993);
see also Michelle S. Simon, Suspended over the Abyss: A City's Quest for Local Autonomy in Institutional Reform Litigation, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 663, 668 n.27 (1996)
(acknowledging that presently there are over 500 local school systems operating pursuant
to court orders to desegregate).
13 See, e.g., Goedert, supra note 11, at 1867. Metropolitan areas around the United
States have more than a 75% minority population, and approximately 90% of minority
students live in metropolitan areas. See Orfield, supra note 10, at 826 & n. 12. Although
outdated, the following statistics from the fall of 1973 show the disparities in the racial
populations of inner-city schools: Chicago (58% black); Philadelphia (61%); Detroit
(70%); Baltimore (70%); Washington (96%); Cleveland (57%); Memphis (68%); St.
Louis (69%); New Orleans (77%); Kansas City, Missouri (56%); Atlanta (81%); Newark
(72%); Oakland (62%); Louisville (52%); and Birmingham (62%). See GRAGUA, supra
note 9, at 281, 341 n.65; Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 14
(1971) (perceiving the patterns and structure of communities, the increase in student
populations, the relocation of families, and other changes directly affecting school planning to neutralize and negate integration efforts at times). Many factors contribute to this
trend, including a notable movement of blacks to urban locales from rural areas and a
lower white than black birth rate, but this trend is most likely accelerated by compulsory
education. See GRAGUA, supra note 9, at 281. James Coleman, the proponent of the
"white flight" theory, concluded from a study of the 20 largest cities in the United States
that the relevant issue concerned the amount to time it would take before the segregating
actions of white flight overcame any successful integration movement resulting in a district that would be comprised of a more segregated population than before. See id.; see
also infra note 144 (discussing the "white flight" theory and opposing views).
Attitudinal changes toward desegregation also may be attributed to the different
viewpoints of the federal judiciary appointed since 1980 by both Presidents Reagan and
Bush. See Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in School Desegregation, 42 EMORY L. 863, 864 (1993). Additionally, the frustration of courts attempting
to unsuccessfully solve problems associated with school desegregation may account for
changes in the judiciary's attitude. See Hansen, supra, at 868.
14 See Goedert, supra note 11, at 1867-68. De jure segregation is directly mandated
or otherwise sanctioned by law. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 293 (Revised 6th ed.
1991). De facto segregation is inadvertent, occurs without legal authority, and results
from social, economic and other factors. See id. at 288; see also Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 192 (1973) (explaining that de facto segregation
exists where discrimination results not from adherence to unconstitutional laws but from
the implementation of techniques such as the gerrymandering of school attendance zones,
the placement of new schools, and the fashioning of school policies that attain or maintain
a segregated school system throughout the district). In Swann, the Court held that school
officials overseeing a district with a history of segregation carried the burden of abolishing all vestiges of discrimination, regardless of its type. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16,
18.
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certain school districts. 5 The question that lingered was whether a district court's remedial authority was tempered in some way or could the
court order remedies which assuredly would provide an integrated district
regardless of the expansiveness and cost. 16 Case law demonstrates that a

district court's authority to remedy such a constitutional violation has
definite limits and that those limits may be an obstacle in attaining effective relief. 17 The judicial question at issue was the scope of authority of a
district court to remedy past instances of segregation."
In a recent case, Missouri v. Jenkins,"9 the Supreme Court addressed

the permissible scope of a district court's authority to order a desegretive
remedy.' Initially, the Court stated that a review of the proper scope of
a district court's remedial authority was integral to deciding whether the
ordered desegregation decrees were beyond the district court's broad

power. 2' The Court found the desegregation order requiring State fund-

ing of salary increases for Kansas City, Missouri, School District
(KCMSD) employees unconstitutional because it was designed to achieve
an interdistrict goal in the absence of an interdistrict violation.'
Fur-

thermore, the Court held that the order mandating continued funding of
quality education programs by the State could not be sustained because an
15 See Goedert, supra note 11, at 1868; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (stating that it
was not enough for school authorities to simply implement race neutral policies but,
rather, these authorities had to make serious attempts to achieve unitariness).
16 CfJ. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (commenting that it is the
duty of the school board to present a plan that assuredly will work, and will work now).
17 See Michael G. Starr, Accommodation and Accountability: A Strategy for Judicial
Enforcement of Institutional Reform Decrees, 32 ALA. L. REV. 399, 439 (1981)
(maintaining that there are practical constraints on what a court is able to do and jurisprudential confines on what it should endeavor to complete).
18 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 (1995). A study focusing on the
three levels of the federal judiciary in school desegregation litigation in Ohio and Michigan described the controversy between those who support the proposition that federal
court intervention undermines local autonomy and those who believe that the federal judiciary must uphold constitutional rights when state authorities and their local counterparts
have failed to do so. See Michael W. Combs, The Federal Judiciary and Northern
School Desegregation:Judicial Management in Perspective, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 345, 34599 (1984)). Evaluating the outcomes from this study, Mr. Combs found that:
district courts and the court of appeals have read the remedial powers of
the federal courts more and more expansively, perhaps out of frustration
and a desire to dispose of these seemingly interminable cases. The Supreme Court, however, seems to have taken an opposing view, resisting
broad shift of power from state and local officials to federal courts, and
championing the perceived virtue of local control.
Id. at 399.
'9 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
2o See id. at 2047.
21 See id.

2' See id. at 2053-54.
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improper test was used to determine whether partial unitary status had

been achieved.Y
In 1977 the KCMSD, the school board, and four children attending

district schools filed a complaint against the State of Missouri and other
defendants in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri.' Plaintiffs claimed that the State and other defendants had
maintained a racially segregated school system.' The district court repositioned the KCMSD as a defendant and found that the KCMSD and the
State were liable for the operation and maintenance of a dual school district in violation of the students' rights pursuant to the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'

To remedy this violation, the

district court designed an expansive desegregation plan to be financed by

23 See id. at 2055. A school district that has attained partial unitary status enjoys diminished judicial control. See Stewart & Torres, supra note 5, at 242 n.14; infra notes
112-113 (discussing the authority of a district court to allow partial withdrawal of control
once the school district has attained partial unitary status); see also infra notes 113-118
and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the factors set forth in Freeman v.
Pitts which the district court should use on remand to determine if partial unitary status
has been achieved; supra note 7 for a general discussion of unitary status.
24 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042. The other defendants included the surrounding
suburban school districts in Missouri and Kansas and several governmental agencies,
specifically the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
because of discriminatory residential policies pursued by the state and federal agency.
See School Dist. of Kansas City, Mo. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo.
1978). The district court dismissed the claims against the surrounding suburban school
districts and the federal defendants. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488
(W.D. Mo. 1984)). The district court dismissed the adjoining school districts from the
suit because the court found no remnants of the pre-1954 segregatory policies in the surrounding school districts and attributed the movement of African-Americans into the
KCMSD to economic causes over which the neighboring school districts had no control.
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 807 F.2d 657, 663-64 (8th Cir. 1986); see Goedert, supra note
11, at 1889-92 and accompanying notes (dealing with the specifics of the suit against the
federal defendants, especially HUD); see also James S. Kunen, The End of Integration,
TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at 39, 41 (noting that the district court judge who excused the
neighboring school districts admitted that he would have reason to regret his decision).
2 See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2042. For a detailed history of the State mandated segregated school system in Missouri see Goedert, supra note 11, at 1882-83; and Stephanie
A. Finley, Eradicating Dual Educational Systems Through Desegregation. Missouri v.
Jenkins, Note, 17 S.U. L. REv. 119, 121-22 (1990). Although the Missouri Attorney
General announced that the desegregation provisions of the Missouri Constitution were no
longer enforceable in 1954, it was not until 1957 that the Missouri legislature repealed its
segregation laws and not until 1976 that the constitutional provisions requiring segregated
schools were rescinded. See Goedert, supra note 11, at 1883. For a discussion of the
history of discrimination in the Eighth Circuit, of which Missouri is a part, see generally
Honorable Gerald W. Heaney, Busing Tnetables, Goals and Ratios: Touchstones of
Equal Opportunity, 69 MINN. L. REv. 735 (1985).
' See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2042. The Equal Protection Clause sets forth that a state
may not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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both the KCMSD and the State.' Since implementation of the court decrees, the State has provided the majority of the supporting funds through

27 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042-45. In June 1985, the district court imposed its
first remedial order which stated as its goal the removal of all the remains of state imposed segregation. See id. at 2042. The court ordered the implementation of improved
quality education programs, magnet schools, reduced class sizes, and the restoration of
the KCMSD to AAA classification which was the highest classification given by the
State's Board of Education. See id. The KCMSD achieved the AAA status during the
1987-1988 academic year and since that time has sustained and has surpassed AAA requirements. See id. at 2043. The quality education programs cost over $220 million.
See id. The district court found no interdistrict violation and, therefore, did not order an
interdistrict reassignment of pupils between the KCMSD and the surrounding suburban
school districts. See id. (citing Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 38); see also Milliken 1, 418
U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974).
Thereafter, in November 1986, the court approved an extensive capital improvements and magnet school plan and required the KCMSD and the State to share joint and
several liability for its funding. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043. The plan was adopted
to afford an increased educational opportunity to every KCMSD student in addition to
hopefully attracting non-minority students from private schools within the KCMSD and
those attending schools in surrounding suburbs. See id. Up to the date of trial, the magnet school program including transportation costs exceeded $448 million. See id. In
April 1993, the trial court contemplated, but rejected, a proposal by the plaintiffs and the
KCMSD concerning a long-range magnet school renewal program. See id at 2043-44.
This program included a 10-year budget of more than $500 million to be funded by the
KCMSD and the State through its joint and several liability. See id. at 2044.
In June 1985, in order to stop the deterioration of the KCMSD's facilities, the district
court mandated substantial capital improvements. See id. The district court considered
"irrelevant" the State's contention that the condition of the facilities was not caused by
unlawful segregation. See id. (citing Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 40). The court concentrated on correcting the remnants of segregation and instituting a desegregation strategy
that would maintain and entice non-minority students into the KCMSD. See id. (quoting
Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 41). The first phase of the capital improvements scheme cost
$37 million. See id. (citing Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 41). Additionally, the district court
mandated that the KCMSD submit another proposal for further capital improvements that
would enable the KCMSD to bring its facilities up to comparable points with those in the
surrounding suburban school districts. See id. (citing Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 41). Then,
in November 1986, the district court accepted a plan for further capital improvements in
order to eliminate the effects of prior racial segregation and to entice non-minority pupils
to return to the KCMSD. See id.
The district court approved, for the most part, a long-range capital improvements
plan submitted by the KCMSD in September 1987 which cost over $187 million. See id.
This plan included renovating approximately 55 schools, closing 18 others, and building
17 new facilities. See id. (citing Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 405). The court ordered such
substantial measures because the other option, the "patch and repair" approach, would
not have attained suburban comparability or have been aesthetically pleasing. See id.
(quoting Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 404). The court reasoned that more extensive renovations than those proposed by the State were necessary or the KCMSD schools would continue to be inferior, deterring new enrollment. See id. (quoting Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at
405). To date, capital improvements costs have soared to over $540 million. See id.
In 1987 the district court instituted salary assistance for KCMSD teachers. See id.
Since the implementation of this decree, the order has been changed to encompass salary
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assistance to virtually every employee in the KCMSD. See id. The total cost of this part
of the desegregation decree since 1987 has exceeded $200 million. See id.
This desegregation decree ordered by the district court has been depicted as the most
expensive and ambitious remedial plan in the annals of school desegregation. See id.
The annual expenditure per student at the KCMSD vastly exceeds that of the surrounding
suburban school districts or of any other school district in Missouri. See id. The
KCMSD has continued to maintain a "friendly adversary" relationship with the plaintiffs
and has persisted in suggesting even more expensive programs. See id. The annual cost
for this desegregation decree is approaching $200 million. See id. These impressive expenditures have financed:
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm
system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2000-square-foot planetarium; green
houses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting
room for 104 people; a Model United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television studios with an editing and
animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie editing and
screening rooms; a 3500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room;
1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project;
swimming pools; and numerous other facilities.
Id. at 2044-45 (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 77 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). The cost of this remedial decree has exceeded the KCMSD's budget. See id. at 2045. The State, through joint and several liability, has borne most of the costs. See id. The district court has admitted to permitting
the district authorities to "dream" and has afforded the resources for those "dreams" to
come true. See id.; for a thorough treatment of the district court's orders see Christina J.
Nielsen, Note, Missouri v. Jenkins: The Uncertain Future of School Desegregation, 64
U. Mo. K.C. L.R. 613, 616-19 (1995).
Subsequently, the KCMSD was unable to provide the funds to support its share of
the costs of the desegregation decree; therefore, the district court ordered a direct increase in property tax levies within the KCMSD. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp
400, 413 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir.
1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)). The Eighth Circuit affirrmed
the district court's holding in part and declared that the district court had the power to
order state and local authorities to levy taxes. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295,
1314 (8th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)). The court of
appeals, however, also noted that principles of federal and state comity demand that
minimally obtrusive means be used to redress a constitutional violation. See id. The appellate court held that from now on, the district court should refrain from imposing property tax increases and, instead, authorized and instructed the local school board to implement its own tax levies so it could adequately provide funds to support its obligation
under the desegregation decree. See id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether a federal court can permissibly impose a tax. See Missouri v.
Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45 (1990) (hereinafter Jenkins II). The Court declined to address
the additional issue presented for review concerning the appropriate scope of the district
court's remedial order. See id.; Raina E. Brubaker, Comment, Missouri v. Jenkins: Wiening the Mistakes of Milliken v. Bradley, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 579, 584 (1996)
(stating that the question the Court denied certiorari to was almost identical to that presented to the Court for review in Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1996)). The Supreme Court held that the lower courts' intrusion into local authority contravened principles of state and local comity and therefore reversed the decisions below. See Jenkins 1H,
495 U.S. at 50. The Court affirmed the Eight Circuit's decision modifying of the funding
order. See id. at 58. For a more detailed discussion of the Court's holding see Linda A.
Schwartzstein, Bureaucracy Unbounded: The Lack of Effective Constraints in the Judicial Process, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 597 (1991); Robert T. Abramson, Note, 21 SETON
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the result of its joint and several liability.' Due to this enormous expense financed predominantly by the State, the State challenged the
of the district court to fashion such a broad desegregation remauthority
29
edy.
The district court found that the order requiring salary increases was
justified because highly qualified employees were needed to maintain a
strong academic curriculum and to implement desegregation programs
aimed at increasing educational opportunities and limiting racial isola-

tion.'

The court based its ruling on removing the effects of segregation

by ameliorating the "desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD.3 The
district court failed to address the State's contention that the State had
achieved partial unitary status in its present quality education program,
and ordered the State to fund the program for the 1992-1993 academic

year.32
The State appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, challenging the district court's implementation of four orThe
ders.33 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding.'
majority opined that the salary increases did relate to the State's prior
constitutional infringement of supporting a system of de jure segregaHALL L. REv. 387 (1991); Finley, supra note 25, at 123-32; Deborah E. Beck, Casenote,
Jenkins v. Missouri: School Choice as a Method for Desegregating an Inner-City School
District, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1029, 1033-38 (1993).
2 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
29 See id.
3"See id. The district court also found that salary increases were necessary to maintain the level of quality of the KCMSD's regular academic program. See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.; see also supra note 23 for a thorough discussion of partial unitary status.
" See Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 757 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, Missouri v.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). The State appealed two district court orders which included base costs of the original group of magnet schools ("flagship magnets") as desegregation expenses for which the State and KCMSD shared joint and several liability. See
id.at 758; see also Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. June 26,
1990) (order granting funding of magnet schools as a desegregation expense); Jenkins v.
Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. July 5, 1991) (order granting KCMSD's
proposal for magnet schools and including base costs as part of the desegregation expense). The State objected to this categorization of base costs as desegregation expenses,
even though the obligation of the KCMSD, because through joint and several liability the
State indirectly financed these expenses. See Jenkins, 11 F.3d. at 759. The flagship
schools were built before the implementation of the district court's desegregation decree
and were converted into magnet schools pursuant to the remedial plan. See id.at 758.
"Base costs" are those necessary expenses associated with running the schools. See id.
The third order disputed the necessity of certain quality education programs for the 19921993 school year. See id.at 757-58; see also Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4
(W.D. Mo. June 17, 1992). The fourth order on appeal mandated that the State subsidize
salary increases for KCMSD employees. See Jenkins, 11 F.3d. at 758; see also Jenkins
v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1992).
3 See Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 769.
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tion.35 Although the district court had failed to address the State's arguments that it had achieved partial unitary status, the court of appeals concluded that the district court had implicitly rejected them.' The Eighth
Circuit relied on student achievement levels in the KCMSD which were
at or below national averages at many grade levels to show that the
KCMSD had not reached its maximum potential and, therefore, had not
achieved partial unitary status.37
3S See id. at 767. The appellate court commented that the State was viewing the constitutional violation and resulting injury too narrowly. See id. The court noted that salary
funding was needed to successfully carry out the desegregation decree. See id. at 768.
The court further explained that highly qualified personnel were needed not only to institute specialized desegregation programs aimed at increasing educational opportunities and
limiting racial segregation, but also to assure that the regular academic program did not
diminish in quality. See id. Additionally, the appellate court found that high quality employees improved the "desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD. See id. The court
considered this broad equitable remedy as appropriate when compared to the nature and
extent of the constitutional infringement. See id. at 767 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
3' See id. at 765. The Eighth Circuit relied on the district court's statements during
the June 17, 1992 hearing and its subsequent orders such as the April 16, 1993 order
which focused on this issue to find the implicit rejection of partial unitary status in the
district court's June 17 order. See id. During the June hearing, the district court noted
that the goal of the desegregation remedy was not to implement quality education programs as the State contended but to desegregate the school district. See id.
The Court's goal was to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri, School District to the maximum degree possible, and all these other matters were
elements to be used to try to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri School
District ....
That's the goal. And a high standard of quality education.
The magnet schools, the summer school program and all these programs
are tied to that goal ....
Id.; see Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1995) (stating that the court of appeals apparently used these findings to determine that the State had not achieved partial
unitary status). The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's observation that:
implementation of programs in and of itself is not sufficient. The test, after
all, is whether the vestiges of segregation, here the systemwide reduction
in student achievement, have been eliminated to the greatest extent practicable. The success of quality of education programs must be measured by
their effect on the students, particularly those who have been the victims of
segregation.
Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 765-66.
37 See Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 765. Over the dissent of five judges, the court of appeals
denied rehearing en banc. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)). First, the dissent examined the ordered salary increases
and portrayed the efforts of the KCMSD, the American Federation of Teachers, and the
plaintiffs to avoid the collective bargaining process as uncalled for and unlikely reasonably related to the constitutional infractions found by the court. See id. at 399 (Beam, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). The dissent also agreed with the argument of the State that the wages paid to trash haulers, parking lot attendants, and food
handlers did not relate to the desegregation plan or to the constitutional infringements.
See id. Second, the dissent declared that the district court had used an incorrect test in
evaluating whether partial unitary status had been achieved by the KCMSD in its quality
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari"8 to determine:
1) whether the district court surpassed its authority in ordering salary increases to virtually all personnel of the KCMSD, and 2) whether the

lower court correctly used findings that student achievement test scores
had not reached some unidentified level to hold that the State had not

reached partial unitary status in its quality education program.39 Before
resolving the direct issues on appeal, the majority opined that an examination of the scope of the lower court's remedial authority was necessary

to determine if the remedial orders of the district court were within its
power.' The Supreme Court held that the order implementing acrossthe-board salary increases for all KCMSD employees, based on the goal
of improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD, exceeded the district court's broad remedial authority.4 ' This goal, the
majority concluded, served an interdistrict purpose when no interdistrict
violation had occurred.42 The Supreme Court also reversed and remanded the district court order requiring the State to fund quality education programs because the lower court applied an inappropriate test to
determine whether partial unitary status had been achieved.43

The United States Supreme Court first analyzed the appropriate
authority of a district court to fashion remedial decrees for segregated
school districts in the noteworthy case of Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II)." Although Brown I held that racial discrimination in public

education programs. See id. at 400. Continuing, the dissent stated that the district court
and the panel had misinterpreted Freeman v. Pins and had imposed an obstacle in the
path of withdrawing judicial supervision over public education that was without basis in
the law. See id.; see also infra notes 113-118 and accompanying text discussing the
Freeman decision. The dissent chided the district court for imbedding a student achievement goal measured by yearly standardized tests into the court's determination of whether
the KCMSD had attained partial unitary status when the Constitution mandated no such
standard. See Jenkins, 19 F.3d at 400. Noting that the KCMSD students had facilities
and programs that offered more educational opportunity than any other district in America, the dissent stated that the district court was not convinced that the KCMSD had
achieved its potential because the KCMSD had failed to achieve national averages on
standardized tests at many grade levels. See id. at 403 (Beam, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). In conclusion, the dissent insisted that this case "as it now
proceeds, involves an exercise in pedagogical sociology, not constitutional adjudication."
Id. at 404 (Beam, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
's See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
3 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1995).
o See id. at 2047; see also supra note 27 observing that the Supreme Court previously denied certiorari on this almost identical issue.
41 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.
42 See id. at 2054.
43 See id. at 2055.
4
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (hereinafter Brown 11).
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schools was unconstitutional,45 the Brown II decision was necessary in
order to further address the manner in which relief was to be granted.'
The majority voiced the traditional determination that the primary responsibility for remedying past instances of segregation rested with
school authorities.47 While remaining loyal to this guiding principle, the
Court stated that district courts must determine whether school authorities
in good faith have complied with constitutional truths in the remedial action." The Supreme Court asserted that equitable principles should guide
a district court in fashioning necessary remedial decrees when school officials have failed to adequately deal with the violation.49 While considering both the private and public interests involved, the majority instructed the district courts' to require the defendants to begin a "prompt
and reasonable start toward full compliance" with the ruling of Brown
IL"The Court remanded the case to the distr;ct courts to implement such
orders and decrees that were necessary and proper to allow plaintiffs to
41 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

Brown I interpreted the large constitu-

tional principle and struck down segregation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); see supra note 4 for further treatment of the Brown I
holding. The Court in Brown II began the struggle of implementing those constitutional
commands into practice. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
4 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298.
' See id. at 299. Specifically, the Court stated that school authorities are primarily
charged with determining, evaluating, and solving these problems. See id; see infra note
111.
4 See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299. The majority noted that the local district courts
most appropriately are able to judicially appraise the desegregation plans of school
authorities because of their prior experience with the case, proximity to local conditions
and the possibility of further hearings. See id. For these reasons, the Court remanded
the case. See id. at 301
49 See id. at 300. The Court set forth that the traditional aspects of equity, which include practical flexibility in fashioning remedial decrees and weighing the public and private needs, should continue to guide the federal trial court in these cases. See id. The
goal, the Court promulgated, was to integrate the public schools for plaintiffs as soon as
practicable. See id. The Court recognized that accomplishing this goal may require the
removal of a number of obstacles so that the school district can adhere to the constitutional principles set forth in Brown . See id. The Court continued by acknowledging
that although the district court may properly consider the public interest in eliminating
any obstacle in an effective and systematic manner, the importance of these constitutional
ideals must not surrender to disagreement. See id.
50 See id. In Brown I the Supreme Court consolidated cases from Kansas, Virgina,
Delaware, and South Carolina because all these suits involved a common legal question
although premised on different local conditions and facts. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483,
486 & n.1 (1954).
51 Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300. The Court commented that once the school district has
made such a start, a court may find that in order to effectively carry out the ruling additional time is needed. See id. If additional time is necessary, the majority placed the
burden upon the defendant to show that the delay was beneficial to the public interest and
was in good faith compliance. See id.
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be admitted to public schools in a racially nondiscriminatory manner

"with all deliberate speed." 52
Almost a decade later, the Court once again confronted a federal
court's power to fashion decrees requiring school districts to comply with
defined constitutional principles.53 The petitioner in Griffin v. County
School Board originally brought suit challenging the discriminatory practices maintained in the public schools of Prince Edward County.' Although previously the Brown I Court had held the segregative policies of
the Prince Edward County school district unconstitutional, attempts to

desegregate the school district were resisted.'
See id. at 301.

The United States Su-

A number of scholars have criticized the tentative approach set
forth in Brown I. See TRIBE, supra note 8, § 16-18, at 1489; R. CARTER, THE WARREN
COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 46, 52-57 (R. Sayler, et al. eds., 1969); Beck, supra note
27, at 1039-40 & n.66 (1993). The Court's initial hesitancy to require immediate nationwide desegregation was understandable upon consideration of the complexities of such a
transition, but its timid approach allowed the initiation of many local schemes to avert the
constitutional mandate of integration. See Beck supra note 27, at 1039-40; see also J.
HARVIE WILKINSON Ill, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 61-77 (1979) (noting that the Brown H1decision can be justified,
"but just barely"). The continued support of this lenient attitude for the 10 years following Brown 11 resulted in 11 southern states still having segregated school districts comprised of 98.8% African-American children. See Beck, supra note 27, at 1040. Upon
realization that school districts were not making appreciable movement towards integration, the Court became impatient. See id.; see e.g., cases listed supra note 8.
" See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
54 See id. at 220-21. Petitioners in Griffin were part of the class action brought before
the United States Supreme Court in Brown L See id. at 221. The Court in Brown I held
that segregated school districts denied African-American students the equal protection of
the law. See Brown 1,347 U.S. at 495).
" See Griffin, 391 U.S. at 221. Through amendments to the Virginia Constitution, in
1956 the State General Assembly and local governments were given the authority to allocate funds to aid students to attend public or nonsectarian private schools as well as the
students' local public school. See id. In 1959 the General Assembly also held a special
session where legislation was enacted to close all public school that had an integrated student population; to end state funding of these desegregated schools; to subsidize children
in non-sectarian private schools through tuition grants; and to include teachers in these
newly created private schools in the State retirement benefit plan. See id. at 221. The
General Assembly abandoned its "massive resistance" to desegregation in April 1959 and
implemented a "freedom of choice" program. See id. at 221-22. The Assembly repealed
the remainder of the 1956 legislation and the tuition grant law of 1959 and replaced these
enactments with a new tuition grant program. See id. at 222. Additionally, the Assembly
repealed the State's mandatory attendance laws with an optional attendance policy. See
id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court
to enjoin discriminatory practices employed by the school district; to require the school
board to take "immediate steps" toward permitting students to enter the white high school
for the 1959 school term without regard to race; and to demand that the school officials
implement similar policies as to elementary school admissions. See id.; cf. Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (implementing more urgent language regarding the integration process by requiring the school board to construct a plan that
52
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preme Court found that the system of tax credits and tuition grants employed in the county had helped to support private white schools, while
the public schools, the only educational facilities available to black students, remained closed.'
The majority held that under these circumstances, the black children of this school district were denied equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "
promised to realistically convert the district to a unitary system in a timely fashion). The
supervisors of the school district, having previously noted that they would not operate a
public school system "wherein white and colored children [were] taught together," refused to levy taxes for the 1959-1960 academic year. See Griffin, 391 U.S. at 222. The
public schools of the county thus failed to reopen for the 1959-1960 school year and were
replaced by a system of private schools indirectly subsidized by the county provided tuition grants and tax credits. See id. at 222-23. A private group immediately assembled to
operate private schools for the white children of the county. See id. at 223. Offers were
made to the African-American community to set up such schools for their children, but
were rejected because they preferred to continue the fight for desegregated public
schools. See id. In 1960 the General Assembly enacted a new grant program allocating
$125 or $150 to every child, regardless of race, to attend a public school or a nonsectarian private school not in the child's near vicinity. See id. The Assembly also authorized
localities to give their own grants. See id. Pursuant to this authority the Prince Edward
Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing an additional tuition grant of $100.
See id. Additionally, the supervisors passed an ordinance giving up to a 25% property
tax credit for donations to any nonsectarian private school. See id. at 223-24. The district court, finding that the actions taken by the board of supervisors were designed to
maintain a segregated school system, enjoined the county from giving tuition grants and
tax credits so long as the public schools stayed closed. See id. at 224. The court interpreted state law as forbidding such state tuition grants in localities without public schools.
See id. at 224 n.8. The court initially abstained from deciding whether the county's public schools could be closed pending determination of state law on this issue by the Virginia courts. See id. at 224. Later, however, the district court ruled on this issue without
waiting for the State court's decision, and held that one district's public schools could not
be closed so as to avoid implementing the constitutionally mandated policies of desegregation while the State allowed other districts' public schools to remain open which were
paid for by taxpayers. See id. at 224. Thereafter, the supervisors and school board
brought a declaratory judgment action in a Virginia circuit court. See id. at 225. These
parties requested that the district court abstain from further action until final rulings were
handed down from the state courts concerning these issues. See id. The district court
declined this request and reiterated that the county could not close its public schools to
avoid desegregation when all other public schools in the State remained open. See id.
Reversing, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court should have declined from adjudicating these issues until the state court had ruled on the validity of the tax credits and tuition grants, as well as the permissibility of closing the public schools. See id.
m See Griffin, 391 U.S. at 230.
57 See id. at 232. Before delving into the substantive question presented for review,
the Supreme Court separately explained why respondents' motion to dismiss was denied.
See id at 226-29. The Court held that the issues required a prompt decision. See id. at
229. The plaintiffs in the original case, the Court noted, had passed high school age. See
id. Continuing, the Court pronounced, "[tihere has been entirely too much deliberation
and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights which we held in [Brown
/] ... had been denied Prince Edward County Negro children." Id. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's judgment remanding the case for abstention
and proceeded to discuss the meritorious issues of the case. See id.
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The Court then addressed the authority of the district court to grant relief
necessary to end racial discrimination in the public schools." Without
questioning the authority of the district court to grant such relief, the Supreme Court approved the injunction issued against county officials by
the district court which prohibited county tuition grants or tax credits
while public schools remain closed.

9

The Supreme Court also stressed

that the district court had the authority to issue further orders to assure
that these petitioners were no longer denied their constitutional rights.'
The Court more precisely defined the scope of authority and the
duty of a district court and local school authorities in implementing de-

segregation plans in public schools in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education.6' In 1969 the District Court for the Western District

of North Carolina ordered the local school board to present an agenda for
both student and faculty desegregation. 62 Both the school district and a
-" See id. at 232. The Court stressed that relief must be quick and effective. See id.
59 See id. The Supreme Court saw this remedy as "appropriate and necessary" because the grants and tax credits had enabled the county to deprive petitioners of a public
school education which every other student in Virginia enjoyed. See id. at 233. The
Court also commented that the district court could mandate that county supervisors levy
taxes in order to raise sufficient funds to reopen, operate, or maintain a public school
system in the district without racial discrimination like those operated throughout the
State. See id.
60 See id. at 233-34.
"' 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
62 See id. at 7. The Court accepted these proposals by the school board on an interim
basis. See id. These plans were only temporary and the Court required the board to
submit a third proposal by November 1969. See id. at 8. Desegregation plans were necessary because the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school board's attempt to desegregate the district through a system of "geographic zoning with a free-transfer provision" had failed.
Id. at 7. In June 1969, of the 24,000 African-American students in the district, 21,000
attended public schools within the metropolitan area of Charlotte. See id. Two-thirds of
those 21,000 students were educated at schools that were 100% or at least 99% black.
See id.
In November 1969, the board submitted a partially completed plan which the district
court deemed unacceptable. See id. at 8. Consequently, the Court appointed an expert to
prepare a desegregation plan for the district. See id. Eventually, the board submitted a
final plan. See id.
Two plans were reviewed by the district court: the "board plan" and the "Finger
plan." See id. The board plan when presented in final form closed seven schools and
redistributed the students attending these schools. See id. To achieve a more equal racial
mix, the board formed new school attendance boundaries but maintained grade structures
and specifically did not use the pairing or clustering methods to desegregate. See id. In
detail, the board plan proposed reassignment of African-American pupils to nine of the
district's ten high schools resulting in 17%-36% black population at each school. See id.
The 10th school's population make-up was left untouched with a minority student composition of 2%. See id. The board plan also rezoned areas for junior high schools. See id.
African-American students now composed 0-38% of the student body at 20 of the 21
junior high'schools. See id. One junior high school remained 90% black. See id. Gerrymandering of geographic zones was used to desegregate elementary schools. See id. at
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court-appointed expert submitted desegregation plans to the court for review.' The final plan accepted by the district court included a racial balance requirement.' Although the use of a ratio to achieve a desegregated
school system was challenged, the Supreme Court upheld the plan determining that the use of this mathematical ratio was merely a starting point
in the process of formulating an appropriate remedy, not an inflexible requirement.' The majority promulgated that the broad and flexible equitable remedial discretion of the district court allowed the court to make
limited use of ratios in forming a desegregation remedy.' The majority
opined that judicial authority to construct a remedial decree arose when
local authorities were unable to acceptably correct their constitutional
violation of maintaining a segregated school system. 67 As is true with
any equity case, the Court reiterated that the type and extent of the constitutional violation dictated the appropriate scope of the remedy. 6' The
9. Over half of the African-American students remained in nine schools which were 86%
to 100% black. See id. Also, school zones were drawn so that half of the white students
attended schools which were 86-100% white. See id.
The Finger plan was prepared by Dr. John Finger, the court-appointed expert,. See
id. This plan closely resembled the board plan with respect to the senior high schools
with the exception that 300 African-American students be transported to a virtually allwhite high school. See id. The Finger plan also modeled the board plan for junior high
schools with the addition of "satellite" zones. See id. These satellite plans created attendance zones that were not continuous with normal surrounding attendance zones and substantially desegregated all district junior high schools. See id. A major distinction between the board plan and Finger plan was evident in the zoning patterns for elementary
schools. See id. The Finger plan not only employed geographic zoning but, also, proposed the use of other zoning, pairing, and grouping methods to achieve a 9-38% African-American population at all elementary schools. See id.
The district court approved the board plan as altered by the Finger plan for the senior and junior high schools. See id. at 10. The court accepted the Finger plan for desegregating the elementary schools. See id.
6 See id. at 7-8.
64 See id. at 23.
65 See id. at 25. The Court stated that awareness of the racial mixture of a school
district is likely to be a helpful starting point in fashioning a remedy to rectify past constitutional violations. See id. The majority also noted that remedying such a constitutional violation did not mean that all schools within communities must always mirror the
racial composition of the entire school district. See id. The Court stressed that if the
district court's holding required, as a substantive constitutional right, any set percentage
of racial balance, that process would be forbidden and the court would be required to reverse. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 24. But see Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S. 1027, 1031-32
(1972) (mem.) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (contending that racial imbalances in a school
district function as a serious detriment to effective educational opportunities for children
of minority groups, especially in the northern and central regions of the United States
where there is an absence of the entrenched social order of segregation).
6 See Swan, 402 U.S. at 25; see also infra note 68 for a brief discussion of equity.
67 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
6 See id. A court's equity power arises from its inherent ability to adjust remedies in
a practicable manner, to eradicate the conditions, or to redress the damages caused by
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Supreme Court concluded that the desegregation plan ordered by the district court was related to the severity of the constitutional violation and

was within the equitable powers of the district court.'
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),' judicial consideration of school

desegregation decrees continued, and the Court restricted the expansive
judicial control over defendant school systems previously enjoyed by the
Brown II and Swann district courts.71 The Supreme Court analyzed the
circumstances under which a district court may order interdistrict relief to
end segregation. 2 Emphasizing the controlling principle enunciated in
Swann, the Court clarified that the scope of the remedy was dictated by
the extent and nature of the constitutional violation.' The Court articuunlawful action. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992). In order to enforce
these underlying principles fairly and adequately, "equitable remedies must be flexible."
See id. A school desegregation case comports with other cases in which a court fashions
equitable remedies to correct the denial of a constitutional right. See id. The Court is
responsible for remedying the constitutional infringement by weighing the individual and
collective interests against one another and finding an equilibrium between the two. See
id.
69 See Swann, 402 U.S. at 30. For a more detailed discussion of Swann see generally
BERNARD ScHWARTZ, SwANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT

(1986).
70 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (5-4 decision) (hereinafter Milliken 1).
71 See Parkman, supra note 2, at 729.
72 See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 741. In Milliken I the Supreme Court asserted that the
district court had fashioned a remedial decree encompassing the metropolitan area to
remedy a system of de jure segregation in the Detroit public schools. See id. at 732.
Acknowledging that no proofs had been offered as to violations by the suburban school
districts or as to the drawing of improper boundaries, the Court stated that the district
court had included 53 of the 85 surrounding school districts and the Detroit district as the
"desegregation area." See id. at 733. The majority set forth that the district court had
noted that plans that excluded the surrounding areas of Detroit would only make the Detroit school district "more identifiably [b]lack." See id. at 732. The Court furthered that
accordingly the lower court recognized the need to look beyond the Detroit school district's boundaries to remedy this problem. See id. at 732-33. The majority agreed with
the trial court's observation that school zone lines are drawn as a matter of political convenience and should not to be used to withhold constitutional rights. See id. at 733. The
court of appeals, the majority professed, affirmed the district court's desegregation plan,
reasoning that such a plan was appropriate because of the violations committed by the
State. See id. at 735. The Supreme Court noted that the appellate court had held that the
State had engaged in de jure segregation and also had controlled the instrumentalities that
would help to correct the vestiges of the discriminatory State acts. See id. at 736. Further, the Supreme Court pointed out that the appellate court had concluded that an interdistrict remedy was within the district court's equity power. See id.
73 See id. at 741 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16). Milliken I is said to illustrate the
problems the Court has experienced in civil rights actions in employing traditional remedial doctrines. See TRIBE, supra note 8, § 16-19, at 1494. In a typical lawsuit, the remedy logically flows from the nature of the underlying violation: "Once the nature of the
defendant's wrong is determined-defeat of plaintiff's expectations, retention of a benefit,
or frustration of a reliance interest-the relief follows as a matter of course." Id., § 16-19,
at 1494-95 (quoting Abram Chayes, Foreword.- Public Law Litigation and the Burger
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lated that although district boundary lines can be bridged when the constitutional violation calls for interdistrict relief, these boundaries may not
be casually ignored or considered a mere administrative convenience. 4
This, the Court determined, was consistent with the tradition of local
control over public education.75 Prior to setting aside the boundaries of
autonomous school districts, the Court professed that there must be a
constitutional violation within one district which caused significant segregative effects in an adjoining district, or a drawing of district boundaries
deliberately shaped because of race.76 The Supreme Court held that because there was no showing of a violation by any of the surrounding
school districts77 and no evidence of any policy which had interdistrict
Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 45 (1982)). Remedial decrees in school desegregation cases
differ because these remedies take the form of court orders restructuring institutions and,
often, requiring continued court oversight. See id., § 16-19, at 1495. Factual circumstances are considered by a district court when fashioning the affirmative injunction,
thereby radically broadening the discretionary element of the relief. See id. The Milliken
I Court, by requiring a close nexus between the ordered remedy and the specifically defined right when confronting extensive de jure segregation, for the first time justified a
segregated outcome in a case where the Court found that a constitutional infringement
existed. See id. Additionally, in Milliken I, a case decided only a few years after the
Swann Court first reviewed and upheld such an order, the Supreme Court overruled a
desegregation decree for the first time. See id.
74 See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 741.
75 See id. at 741-42. The Court noted that local control over public schools has been
thought to be essential to the continuity of community support and concern for schools
and to the maintenance of the quality of educational systems. See id. at 741-42 (citing
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972)). The Milliken I
Court claimed that Michigan's education system providing for considerable local control
was similar to that of most states, and the Court carefully detailed the disruption that
would be caused by the interdistrict remedial decree approved by the two lower courts.
See MiUiken 1, 418 U.S. at 742-43; see also Brubaker, supra note 27, at 591 (explaining
that the interdistrict remedy exceeded the district court's authority because it would bind
an innocent independent political entity); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976)
(advocating that in the Milliken I opinion the Court's reason for refusing to order a metropolitan area desegregation order, although addressing the many practical problems associated with the consolidation of many school systems by judicial decree, was grounded
upon the fundamental limitations imposed upon the remedial authority of a federal court
to rearrange the operation of state and local governing bodies).
Tribe questioned the Court's finding that the district boundary lines were sacrosanct,
especially because the Court had previously ruled that local student assignments did not
enjoy a sacred position as a symbol of local autonomy and control over public schools.
See TRIBE, supra note 8, § 16-19, at 1495; Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 733.
76 See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745. The Court simply intimated that if there was not
an interdistrict violation or an interdistrict effect, there was no constitutional wrong which
could be corrected by an interdistrict remedy. See id.
77 See id. Evidence introduced at trial showed that during the latter part of the 1950s,
the Carver District, a predominantly African-American suburban district, arranged to
have its minority students transferred to a predominantly African-American school in Detroit. See id. at 749. Carver was an autonomous school district that did not have a high
school because of the lack of an adequate location for high school facilities. See id. In
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effects, the district court had exceeded its remedial authority by ordering
the metropolitan area to be included in the desegregation area.78
1960 a predominantly white suburban school district, the Oak Park School District, annexed the Carver School District at the suggestion of local officials. See id. No claim
was made that the 1960 annexation was initiated to further a segregative purpose or to
achieve a segregative result or that the Oak Park School District maintained a dual system. See id. at 750. According to the appellate court, this arrangement was necessitated
by the refusal of the surrounding white districts to accept Carver students. See id. The
Supreme Court, while noting that this situation might have had a segregative impact on
the student populations of both the districts involved, stated that nothing in the record
supported the appellate court's supposition that the suburban schools had refused to admit
the Carver students. See id. Quoting the familiar phrase of Swann that "the nature of the
violation determines the scope of the remedy," the Supreme Court declared that this isolated instance involving two school districts did not justify the expansive metropolitan
remedy ordered by the district and appellate courts. See id.
' See id. at 752-53. The Court addressed the dissent's position that once State participation was found, the lower court should have had authority to reconstruct the school
districts surrounding Detroit. See id. at 745-46. The majority opinion assumed arguendo
that State agencies had participated in maintaining a segregated system in Detroit but
disagreed with the dissent as to the appropriate federal power to remedy this constitutional wrong. See id. at 746. The majority proferred that when disparate treatment of
black and white students occurred within the Detroit system and not in the surrounding
suburbs, the remedy must be contained within that district. See id. at 746 (citing Swann,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). The Court explicitly rejected the dissent's contention that the
cross-district transportation of students was a way to devise a "suitably flexible remedy"
for a violation of the rights of African-American students in Detroit. See id. at 747. The
majority emphasized that this type of interdistrict remedy could be validated only by an
insupportably expansive interpretation of the constitutional right to attend a unitary school
system. See id.
The 5-4 split in the Court demonstrated the fundamental disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices regarding the purpose of school desegregation. See TRIBE, supra
note 8, §16-19, at 1494 n.9. Previously, the Swann Court unanimously stated that once
the existence of a de jure system was established the district court or school authorities
must seriously attempt to attain the greatest possible proportion of actual desegregation.
See id. (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 26). The Milliken I dissent understood Swann to
mean that school officials must do all that they practicably can to ensure a unitary school
population. See id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 802) (Marshall, J.,dissenting)). The
majority opinion, however, interpreted the Swann declaration differently and saw it as
requiring a remedy that restored individuals subject to discriminatory actions to the place
they would have been in without such conduct. See id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at
746). Therefore, the Court reasoned that because there was no evidence submitted of
interdistrict segregative action, it followed that the sole constitutional right of minority
students living in Detroit was to go to a desegregated school in that district. See id.
(quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746). The Court's dispute as to the ultimate goal of
school desegregation evidenced itself in the Court's handling of the State's accountability
for local school segregation. See id. The Milliken I majority characterized right and
remedy depending on the violation's jurisdictional impact. See id. The majority opined
that State action that indirectly or directly contributed to the de jure segregation in the
Detroit school system obliged the State only to attain a desegregated Detroit district. See
id. The dissenting Justices, however, construing right and remedy on the basis of the
outcome and the presence of discriminatory state practices, direct or vicarious, required
the State to exercise its affirmative duty to use all of its power, including its authority to
refashion school district boundaries if needed, in a way that aided desegregation in fact.
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In 1977 the Court once again addressed the scope of and the possible limits on the school desegregation decree set forth in Milliken I in
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11).9 Specifically, the Court held that ordering remedial education programs as a component of a school desegregation decree did not exceed the authority of the district court.'
AlSee id. The dissent concluded, based on a different desegregative objective, that the majority allowed Michigan to successfully shield itself from its obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish effective desegregation remedies by conferring power over
its public school systems in the local districts. See id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at
763) (White, J., dissenting)). For a critical discussion of the Milliken I Court's holding
see Goedert, supra note 11, at 1872-76; see also Beck, supra note 27, at 1043-44
(enunciating that Milliken I greatly reduced the ability of a federal court to require interdistrict relief); Brubaker, supra note 27, at 591 (noting that the Milliken I decision is
often criticized because it endorsed, and even invited, "white flight" from the inner-cities
to the surrounding suburbs where white children were sheltered from forced integration).
Milliken I held that the underlying constitutional violation, whether it be interdistrict
or intradistrict, was mutually exclusive. See Parkman, supra note 2, at 729. Therefore,
a remedy affecting another district needed to be supported by a violation occurring in a
surrounding district or a constitutional violation producing significant segregative effects
in adjoining districts. See id. at 729-30 (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-45). Subsequently, in Hills v. Gautreaux, the Court distinguished. Milliken I and held that at times a
district court has the power to order remedies that affect surrounding areas which have
not participated in the segregative practices. See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296 (1973).
The Gautreaux Court opined that a district court should be able to exercise remedial
powers in this way so long as resulting orders have no segregative effects and do not bind
innocent districts. See id. For a more detailed discussion of Gautreaux see infra note
152. These seemingly contradictory decisions failed to provide instruction as to when a
court may include innocent school districts in a remedial decree aimed at a segregated
school district. See Parkman, supra note 2, at 730. But see Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. 2038, 2057 (1995) (O'Connor J, concurring) (finding that Gautreaux did not overrule
the predicates of Milliken I necessitating a finding of significant segregative effects on
surrounding school districts before an interdistrict remedy could be imposed). Consequently, the Supreme Court in Milliken II undertook the task of providing additional insight into and specifically defining the scope of a federal court's remedial power. See
Parkman supra note 2, at 730. See generally Elwood Hain, Sealing Off the City: School
Desegregation in Detroit, in LIMrTS OF JUSTICE: THE CouRTs' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 223-308 (Howard I. Kalodner & James J. Fishmam eds., 1978) (discussing
in-depth the circumstances leading up to the Milliken I decision).
79 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (hereinafter Milliken I1).
80 See id. at 287. The four educational components at issue included reading, inservice training, testing, and counseling and career guidelines. See id. at 275-76. As
part of the desegregation order, the district court approved the school board's plan which
contained these educational components. See id. at 277. The State and the Detroit
School Board were to share the costs of these four programs. See id. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the order of the district court and explicitly approved findings as to the need for
these compensatory programs. See id. at 277-78.
The Supreme Court opined that often an effective remedy involved innovative solutions. See id. at 283. The Court held that the trial court had not exceeded its equitable
authority by ordering education programs as part of the desegregation decree for Detroit
and set forth three equitable principles which govern a district court when implementing a
desegregation plan. See id. at 280-81. First, the Court professed that a district court
needs to consider the impact of the violation to ensure that the remedy is closely related to
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though never having directly addressed the permissibility of remedial
education programs as part of a court decree,81 the Supreme Court once
again stressed that the lower courts should follow equitable principles in
fashioning desegregation decrees.' The Court discussed the additional
steps besides pupil reassignment that district courts had previously taken
to remedy desegregation depending on the scope and extent of the underlying constitutional violation." The Court concluded that the district
court's remedial decree was adequately tailored to remedy the constitutional violation and, thus, did not surpass the district court's desegregative authority."
Against this foundation of precedent, the United States Supreme
Court, in Missouri v. Jenkins," determined that the district court had ex-

ceeded its remedial desegregative authority by ordering programs, including salary increases for virtually all school district employees, which
attempted to achieve an interdistrict goal when there had been no correthe constitutional violation. See id. at 280. Second, the Court determined that the remedy should strive to restore individuals to the position that they would have been in without the constitutional infringement. See id. at 280 (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746).
Third, the Court stressed that a district court should respect the right of state and local
officials to manage their local affairs. See id. at 280-81.
" Id. at 279 & n.13. The Milliken I Court asserted that the district court's order in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education included in-service training programs, but in affirming the decree, the Supreme Court did not specifically address the
permissibility of this type of program. See id. at 279 n.13. Also, the Court commented
that in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, the Supreme Court explicitly
avoided passing on the lower court's holding which required "compensatory education in
an integrated environment." See id. (quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. 189, 214 n.18 (1973)).
82 See id. at 279-80 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)).
83 See id., 433 U.S. at 282-83.
Noting a number of cases that approved remedial
plans encompassing more than pupil reassignment, the Supreme Court specifically relied
on United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. and Swann to show that such plans
do not necessarily exceed the scope of a district court's authority. See id. at 287. In
Montgomery County, the Court did not focus on pupil reassignment but instead implemented policies to desegregate faculty and staff as necessary to dismantle the dual system.
See United States v. Montgomery County Bd.'of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1969).
Thus, the Montgomery County Court promulgated the proposition that a federal court
must occasionally address issues other than student assignment to rectify the effects of
prior segregation. See id. The Swann Court reaffirmed the principle that discriminatory
student assignment plans can negatively affect other aspects of the school system and incorporate further inequalities. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21. Accordingly, the Milliken
1ICourt averred that federal courts "cannot close their eyes to inequalities" which result
from a segregated system. See Milliken H, 433 U.S. at 283.
84 See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 287. The Court also found that the Eleventh Amendment was not violated by requiring the State to finance these programs because the decree
only required the State to conform its conduct to constitutional principles and to provide
prospective equitable relief, even though this included expenditures by the State. See id.
at 289; Parkman, supra note 2, at 731-32 (claiming that the Milliken I1decision once
again broadened the scope of a federal trial court's power).
s 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995) (5-4 decision).
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sponding interdistrict violation." The Court also held that the district
court used an inappropriate test to determine if partial unitary status had
been achieved within the district." Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by providing a general overview of the procedural
history of this much litigated case." After developing the background for
this controversy, the majority discussed the propriety of the district
court's order of salary increases to virtually all KCMSD employees."
Ancillary to this determination, but necessary to resolve the ultimate
question, the Court found that an attack upon the scope of the district
court's remedial order was correctly within the question presented.'
The majority addressed Justice Souter's argument that the Court's
decision to review the breadth of the district court's remedial power was

86 See id. at 2053-54. For an additional discussion of the Missouri v. Jenkins decision
see Gary D. Allison & Louis W. Bullock, Backlash: The Court Protects the Entrenched
Advantages of the Majority, 31 TULSA L. J. 425, 426-29 (1996).
87 See id. at 2055. The Eighth Circuit suggested that the State could establish an interdistrict program if it desired which included requiring suburban districts to allow minority students to transfer from the KCMSD. See Beck, supra note 27, at 1036 n.46.
This is possible because the State is not limited by constraints that bind a federal court.
See id.
8 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042-45. The Court noted that this case had been before
the same district judge for 18 years. See id. at 2042; see also supra notes 24-43 and accompanying text discussing the path of this much litigated case. Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined the Court's opinion. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
For an additional discussion of the Court's opinion see Parkman, supra note 2, at 739-53;
Brubaker, supra note 27; Simon, supra note 11, at 678-681.
" See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court's
grant of certiorari in Jenkins 11 to review only the method by which the lower court had
funded the desegregation decree solely indicated that the Court resisted the State's attempt
to challenge the scope of the remedial decree at that time. See id. (citing Jenkins 11, 495
U.S. 33, 53 (1990)); see Brubaker, supra note 27, at 584 (noting that the question the
Court denied certiorari to in Jenkins II was almost identical to that accepted for review in
the present case because it was fairly included in the questions presented). The Chief
Justice stressed that the Jenkins I1 Court "neither 'approv[ed]' nor 'disapprov[ed]'" the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the lower court's remedy was permissible. See Jenkins,
115 S. Ct. at 2047 (quoting Jenkins II, 495 U.S. at 53); supra note 27 discussing the
scope of the Supreme Court's review in Jenkins 11.
9o See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047. Supreme Court Rule 14.1 governs the procedures
litigants are to follow when submitting a writ of certiorari to the Court. See SUP. CT. R.
14.1. ("The statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary
question fairly included therein. Only the questions set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court."). The ancillary question is required to
be more closely associated to the question submitted than merely relating to or complementing that question. See Brubaker, supra note 27, at 587. The Court previously noted
that Rule 14. 1(a) makes the petitioner concentrate on the issues the Court has considered
to be especially important, thus allowing the Court to efficiently allocate limited resources. See id. at 587-88 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536
(1992)). But see infra note 219 discussing the dissent's interpretation of Rule 14.1.
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"both unfair and imprudent".9 The Chief Justice cited the dissent's
claim that the Court's previous denial of certiorari on the State's attack of
the district court's remedial power in Jenkins I' was a factor that influenced respondents to present their case without adequate attention to the
basic issue." The majority noted the dissent's position that the failure to
address this basic issue now affected the Court's decision.' Chief Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with Justice Souter's arguments and reiterated that a
failure to grant a writ of certiorari does not indicate the Court's opinion
regarding the merits of a case." The Chief Justice stressed that respondents were not lulled into a "false sense of security" because the Court's
decision in Jenkins II made respondents aware that the district court's
remedial -authority had not been affirmed.' The Court also emphasized
that in the Jenkins H decision, at least four Justices had questioned the
court's remedy.'
The majority noted that the State yet again had challenged the district court's remedial authority to demand the specific orders at issue."
Both the district court and the court of appeals, the Chief Justice pointed
out, were aware of this challenge.' Moreover, the majority contended,
the State included this challenge in its certiorari petition in addition to arguing that the salary increases ordered by the lower court had exceeded
the scope of the district court's remedial authority.1" The Chief Justice
expounded that all involved parties, including the reviewing courts, had
recognized the expansiveness of the district court's remedial authority to
be at issue.' °
Dismissing Justice Souter's arguments, the majority
opined that there was "no unfairness or imprudence" in including issues

9' See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047; infra notes 217-220 and accompanying text
(setting forth Justice Souter's disagreement with the Court's willingness to review the
proper scope of the district court's remedial authority when it had not been accepted for
review).
9' 495 U.S. 33 (1990); see supra note 27 for a brief discussion of the Court's holding
in Jenkins I.

93 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047.
94 See id.

95 See id. (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)).
9 See id. at 2047 (citing Jenkins H, 495 U.S. 33, 53 (1990)).
'7 See id. (citing Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 75-80) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047.
99 See id. at 2047-48.
See id. at 2048 The majority restated that the respondents' brief contended that the

'o

State's attack on the breadth of the remedial authority of the district court was not fairly
presented and was meritless. See id.
101See id.
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to be decided by the Court which had been passed upon below, had been
properly brought before the Court, and had been briefed by all parties. 2
The majority then proceeded to discuss relevant precedent concerning the authority of a district court to fashion orders remedying the effects of segregated school districts." 3 The Chief Justice first interpreted
the Swann Court's holding as identifying the discretion that must attach
to a district court when fashioning a remedy, while also acknowledging
limits on such remedial authority." 4 The majority then furthered the
Court's historical perspective through an analysis of Milliken I, where the
Court held that a district court had surpassed the permissible level of remedial authority by creating interdistrict relief when the neighboring
school districts had not committed any constitutional violation. 0 5 The
Chief Justice quoted the Milliken I decision which stressed that in the absence of an interdistrict violation, or an interdistrict effect, interdistrict
relief was not available."°
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued by outlining the three-part framework set forth in Milliken II to aid district courts in exercising their remedial authority.0 " First, the Court reiterated the principle behind equitable remedies- that the nature of the remedy is dictated by the nature and
breadth of the constitutional abridgment.' ° Second, the majority stated
See id.
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048-49.
104See id. at 2048. The majority, quoting the Swann Court, stated:
[Ellimination of racial discrimination in public schools is a large task and
one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of the school authorities. One vehicle can carry
only a limited amount of baggage. It would not serve the important objective of Brown I to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, although desegregation of schools ultimately will have
impact on other forms of discrimination.
Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971));
see supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of Swann.
105 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1974)).
For a more thorough treatment of Milliken I see supra notes 70-78 and accompanying
text.
106 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745). The Court
observed that the Milliken I Court also rejected the contention that schools comprised of a
majority of African-American students were not desegregated whatever the racial population of the district's boundaries and however neutrally the school district's zoning lines
had been fashioned and administered. See id. (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 747 n.22).
'o7 See id. at 2049 (citing Milliken 11, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)).
'08 See id. (quoting Milliken H1, 433 U.S. at 280) (promulgating that the character of
the desegregation decree is to be guided by the nature and reach of the constitutional violation). Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Milliken 11 Court added further to this
factor by clarifying that it simply meant that there must be a nexus between the federal
court decree and the constitutional violation. See id. at 2049 (quoting Milliken 11, 433
U.S. at 280).
'02
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that the desegregation decree must be specifically drafted so as to enable
a victim of discriminatory actions to be restored to the position the individual would have attained without such violative conduct.

9

Third,

when fashioning a remedy, the Chief Justice noted, the federal courts
must consider state and local interests in controlling their own affairs as
allowed pursuant to the Constitution.11 o
Because Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that federal oversight of
local school districts was only meant as a temporary means to remedy
past discrimination," the majority then considered the necessary showing

a school district operating pursuant to a desegregation order must make
for partial or complete relief from such an order."' Looking to Freeman
109See id. (quoting Milliken I1,433 U.S. at 280).
"0 See id. (quoting Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81). In applying this framework the
majority pointed out six areas set forth in Green v. County Sch. Board. which the Court
had previously reviewed to aid in the determination of whether a school district is racially
identifiable. See id. The Court articulated that "student assignments, . . . 'faculty, staff,
transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities,'" were indicia of segregated school
districts. Id. at 2049 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991).
". See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247); United States v.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1641 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,concurring) (commenting that education has traditionally been the responsibility of the states because of history and their expertise in this area); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (finding that the district
court's end purpose was not only to remedy the constitutional violation but also to restore
433 U.S. 267, 280control of the school system to state and local authorities); Milliken I1,
81 (1977) (asserting that when fashioning a remedy, a federal court must consider the interests of local and state governments in controlling their own affairs); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (Dayton 1)(observing that local autonomy
of school systems is an important national tradition); Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42
(1974) (recognizing that the deeply rooted tradition of local control over public education
has long been considered essential both to preserving community interest and support for
public education and to maintaining the quality of school systems); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1973) (noting that local control over education provides citizens the opportunity to become involved in decision-making, allows
communities the ability to structure educational programs to fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence"); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972) (asserting
that citizens strongly desire to have direct control over the education of their children);
see also Simon, supra note 12 (discussing the conflict in school desegregation cases between maintaining local control and remedying constitutional violations).
12 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049. The Court has insisted that relief from a desegregation decree is available once the constitutional violator has attained unitary status. See
supra note 23 (differentiating between dual and unitary dist.ricts). The concept of unitariness, the Court has explained, has been useful in delineating the scope of the a trial
court's power, for it conveys the principle that a district once operating as a dual system
must be analyzed both at the time the remedial decree is ordered and when one of the
parties requests a modification or withdrawal of the district court's remedial control. See
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 486. The Court has stressed that the requirement of a unitary system needs to be implemented pursuant to the guiding principles governing equitable
remedies. See id. at 487; supra note 68 and accompanying text for a brief treatment of
equitable remedies. Pursuant to a federal court's flexible equitable power, the Court has
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v. Pitts,"3 the Chief Justice specifically set forth three factors which must
be entertained by a court when contemplating a request for partial withstated that once a school district has attained partial unitary status, the tribunal has the
discretion to require a partial withdrawal of control over the district. See Freeman, 503
U.S. at 489. This discretion, the Court has promulgated, also arises from the constitutional authority that substantiated the lower court's initial intervention and the court's ultimate objectives of remedying the violation and returning control of the school district to
state and local authorities. See id. The Court has noted that permitting a district court to
relinquish control of some, but not all, areas concerning the desegregation decree illustrates the use of equitable discretion. See id. at 493. The Court has professed that by
withdrawing supervision over areas that no longer require judicial intervention, a district
court can focus the court's and the school district's resources on areas still affected by de
jure segregation. See id. But see Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The
Subtle Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REv.
147 (1993) (suggesting that the partial withdrawal of supervision permits school districts
to take actions that may have a resegregatory impact on areas where compliance has been
achieved).
"' 503 U.S. 467 (1992). In Freeman, petitioners filed a motion in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia asking for dismissal of the litigation
because petitioners had eliminated the dual school system previously in place and had
achieved unitary status. See id. at 473. The district court examined the Green factors in
addition to considering the quality of education afforded to white and to black students
and found that the district was a unitary system with respect to student assignments,
transportation, facilities, and after school activities and, therefore, ordered no additional
relief in those areas. See id. at 474. The lower court, however, did not dismiss the case
because the district had not achieved unitary status in every respect. See id. The district
court found that remnants of the segregated system lingered in the areas of instructional
employee and principal assignments, resource disbursements, and quality of education.
See id. The district court ordered that adequate measures be taken to remedy these
problems. See id.
Both parties appealed and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ultimate
conclusion that the district had yet to reach unitary status. See id. at 484. The appellate
court, however, reversed the lower court's ruling that the district had no continuing responsibilities as to student assignments. See id. The circuit court rejected the lower
court's approach of individually reviewing each of the Green factors to determine
whether unitary status had been attained, and held that unitary status was achieved only if
a school system satisfied all six Green categories at the same time over a period of years.
See id. Because the district had not reached unitary status in all categories at one time,
the Eleventh Circuit propounded that the district could not be relieved of its constitutional
duties by blaming demographic shifts for student assignment patterns which happened
before unitary status was declared. See id. at 484-85. The appellate court held that petitioners were responsible for the racial imbalance in the student the population and would
be required to take actions that "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and
even bizarre in some situations" to remedy the imbalance. Id. at 485 (quoting Swann,
402 U.S. at 28).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that in the course of overseeing a desegregation decree, a federal court has the power to give up partial control and supervision of school districts before the district has completely complied with unitary requirements in all areas of school operation. See id. at 485, 490. The majority professed that
the district court, in exercising the prerogative to order the partial withdrawal of judicial
control, must consider the purposes and goals of equitable power in a desegregation case.
See id. at 491. Continuing, the Freeman Court promulgated that the district court had not
erred in this instance by ordering a partial withdrawal over some areas of the desegrega-
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First, the majority stated that the Court must determine

whether the school district has completely and acceptably complied with
the desegregation decree in the parts of the school system where federal
oversight would be withdrawn.1 5 Second, the Chief Justice enunciated
that a court must decide whether continued judicial control would be

needed or practicable to attain compliance with the court decree in other
areas of the school system. 1 6 Third, the majority asserted that a court

needs to consider whether the district has demonstrated its good faith
commitment, to the public, parents, and pupils of the previously disfavored race, to comply with the court's entire decree, all laws, and the
Constitution."" Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the ultimate inquiry focused on whether the constitutional infringer had adhered to the
desegregation decree in good faith throughout its implementation, and
whether the remains of past discrimination had been eradicated to the
extent practicable."' Before addressing the specific orders at issue, the
majority professed that a proper analysis of such remedial decrees rested
upon the orders serving as an appropriate method to place those discriminated against in the position that they would have attained in the absence
of such conduct." 9 The Court also asserted that this analysis focused on
restoring control to State and local officials of a school district that is operating pursuant to the Constitution."

tion decree. See id. at 492. The Court additionally recognized that the district court appropriately exercised equitable discretion by considering the quality of education, an area
not previously included as one of the six factors evaluated, when determining whether
unitary status had been reached under Green. See id. at 492-93. The Court concluded
by rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's holding that retention of judicial supervision over student assignments was needed to achieve compliance in the other areas of the school system. See id. at 496-97. The Court focused on the respondents' failure to show that racial
balancing was a proper means to remedy other deficiencies. See id. at 498. The Court
remanded the case so that the district court could make specific' findings concerning this
issue. See id.; for an additional discussion of Freeman see Kevin Brown, The Legal
RhetoricalStructurefor the Conversion of Desegregation Lawsuits to Quality Education
Lawsuits, 42 EMoRY L.J. 791, 799-803 (1993).
"14 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049.
15 See id. (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491).
"6 See id. (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491).
"7 See id. (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 249-50 (1991) (commenting that a federal trial court should consider whether the
violator had followed the desegregation decree in good faith and whether the remains of
the discriminatory conduct had been removed to the extent practicable); see also Morgan
v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987) (stressing that a finding of good faith reduces
the probability that a school district's acquiescence with court decrees is but a short-lived
constitutional ritual).
"' See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492).
119 See id.
' See id. (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489).
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Turning to the specific orders challenged, the Chief Justice first addressed the State's argument that the order implementing salary increases
exceeded the district court's authority because it was designed to achieve
an "interdistrict goal," when the constitutional violation was only
"intradistrict" in nature.' The majority once again set forth the principle that the type of desegregation remedy is dictated by the nature and
scope of the underlying constitutional violation.'
The majority further
stated that the most appropriate course of action for an intradistrict infraction is an intradistrict solution" that attempts to terminate the racial
identity of a school's population that is in the effected district by eradicating, to the extent practicable, the remains of de jure segregation affecting all aspects of the school system's operations." The Chief Justice
noted that both the district court and the Eighth Circuit agreed that there
was no interdistrict constitutional violation involved in this case which
would necessitate interdistrict relief."
Thus, the Court posited, the
proper remedy to be fashioned by the trial court should have focused on
eliminating the remains of previous de jure segregation found within the
KCMSD.'2
The majority recognized that both lower courts believed that a solely
intradistrict remedy would be inadequate due to the 68.3% AfricanAmerican enrollment level in the KCMSD. 12 ' The Chief Justice, however, professed that the Court in Milliken I had rejected the notion that
schools comprised of a majority of African-American students were not
desegregated regardless of the racial composition of the school district's
121

See id.

'2 See id. at 2049-50 (quoting Milliken IH,433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)); Pasadena City

Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976) (articulating that there are certain
boundaries that a court may not cross when dismantling a dual school system).
123 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050; Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746-747.
124 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050; Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250
(1991); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971)
(recognizing that the first remedial duty of officials in previously maintained dual districts
is to eradicate invidious racial distinctions); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
437-38 (1968) (requiring the school districts operating state mandated dual systems to engage in affirmative conduct to convert the districts to unitary systems and to eliminate the
practice of racial discrimination both "root and branch").
'2 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050 (citing Jenkins H, 495 U.S. at 37 n.3) (adding that
the district court had also ruled that the discriminatory conduct had not affected the sur-

rounding school districts and therefore dismissed the suit against the suburban districts
and denied an interdistrict remedy)
126 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050. Chief Justice Rehnquist enunciated that the vestiges of discrimination in the KCMSD specifically consisted of a district-wide decline in

student achievement levels and the presence of 25 schools that were racially identifiable
with a student population that was over 90% African-American. See id.
127

See id.
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The Court

contended that the district court had not attempted to eliminate the racial
identity of the schools comprising the KCMSD,'" but instead had initiated a program to develop a district equal to or better than the neighboring suburban school districts."3 The majority noted that the district court
had focused on "desegregative attractiveness" and "suburban comparaThe objective of "desegregative atbility" in fashioning a remedy.'
tractiveness", the Chief Justice pointed out, was to remedy the districtwide decrease in student achievement and to attract non-minority pupils
Chief Justice
not currently attending schools in the KCMSD."
Rehnquist noted the breadth of this remedy consisted of an elaborate plan
for capital improvements, course enhancement, and extracurricular enrichment in not only the previously identifiable African-American schools
but in many schools within the district.' 33 The majority observed that the
district court's remedial orders had converted almost all of the schools
within the KCMSD into magnet schools."3
'
See id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 745, 747 n.22 (1974)); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 494 (1992) (promulgating that a racial imbalance in pupil attendance zones was
not equivalent to evidence that the district was not following the desegregation decree);
Milliken 11, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977) (articulating that the Court had continually
held that racial imbalances alone in a school system did not violate the Constitution);
Dayton 1, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (averring that the existence of racially identifiable
schools in a racially mixed community without more does not violate the Constitution);
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (refusing to require the school district to annually rearrange its attendance zones so as to permanently
maintain the recommended racial mix ordered by the district court); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971) (professing that the presence of a small
number of single-race schools within one district, in and of itself, does not indicate a segregated district); see, e.g., United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S.
484, 491 n.5 (1972) (impliedly approving a desegregation plan with a student racial composition of 86% black and 14% white); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451, 457 (1972) (approving a desegregation plan resulting in a 66% black and 34% white
district); Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432 (1968) (upholding a desegregation plan
with a final racial make-up of 57% black and 43% white).
But see Goedert, supra note 11, 1867-82
'9 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050.
(supporting an interdistrict remedy when dealing with a racially identifiable district).
130 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 2051.
133 See id.
"MSee id. The district court had converted all high schools, all middle schools, and
50% of the elementary schools within the KCMSD into magnet schools. See id. Generally understood, magnet schools are part of the public school system and have distinctive
curricula and scholastic programs of a high quality aimed at promoting integration by attracting students from their local and private schools. See Brubaker, supra note 27, at
583; Kimberly C. West, Note, A Desegregation Tool that Backfired: Magnet Schools and
Classroom Segregation, 103 YALE L.J. 2567, 2568-71 (1994) (explaining the purposes of
magnet schools and their specific role in desegregation). See generally Christine H.
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The Chief Justice recognized that the Court had previously approved
intradistrict desegregation remedies including magnet schools,135 which
have the benefit of supporting the voluntary relocation of students within
a district to help remedy desegregation without resorting to extensive
busing and the refashioning of school zones." Chief Justice Rehnquist,
however, impugned the district court's remedial plan which the Court
stated was not designed to redistribute students within the KCMSD so as
to eradicate racially identifiable schools but, rather, to attract nonminority pupils from outside districts.137 The majority expounded that
this goal exceeded the scope of the intradistrict violation found by the
district court. 38 The Chief Justice declared that, in effect, the district

court had developed a remedy to achieve indirectly what concededly the
lower court lacked the remedial power to order directly.' 39
Next, the majority further clarified the meaning of an interdistrict
violation as set forth in Milliken I as a violation that precipitated segregation in adjoining districts." The majority maintained that in Milliken I
there was no reason to believe that the district court could have bypassed
limitations on its remedial power by mandating that the constitutional
violator institute a magnet school plan fashioned to attain the same interdistrict movement of students that was held to exceed the court's remedial authority if ordered directly. 4 The Chief Justice asserted that the
district court had done just that by making the KCMSD a magnet district
Rossel, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues
During the Four Decade Evolution of the Plans, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 613, 619
(1995) (stating that the magnet school concept was popularized in 1975 and 1976 when
district courts in Houston, Milwaukee, and Buffalo approved such voluntary transfer programs).
135See, e.g., Milliken 1I,
433 U.S. 267, 272 (1977).
"s See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2051. The majority stated that magnet schools are an
attractive component in an intradistrict remedy because they encourage desegregation
while preventing to some extent the withdrawal of white students from the district that
might occur from mandatory student reassignment. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051;
Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp 19, 37 (W.D. Mo. 1985); cf U.S. v. Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (noting that avoidance of "white flight"
cannot substantiate achieving anything less than full compliance with unitary status).
'17See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
"' See id.
139See id.(citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 38 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd as
modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986)) (stating that due to the limitation on the court's
remedial power in restructuring the functions of state and local governments, any required program extending beyond the zoning lines of the KCMSD exceeded both the nature and scope of the underlying constitutional violation).
14oSee id. at 2052; supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Mi~liken 1.
141See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2052. But see supra note 87 (suggesting that the State
on its own initiative could implement such a remedy because it was not constrained by the
same limits as was the district court).
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so as to allow the court to achieve the interdistrict goal of attracting nonminority pupils from the encircling suburban school districts and relocating them within the KCMSD. 42 The Chief Justice then found that the
goal of "desegregative attractiveness" exceeded the reach of the trial
court's broad remedial power." 4 The majority considered respondents'
argument that the district court's dependence upon "desegregative attractiveness" was justified based upon the court's observation that segregation had caused "white flight"'" to surrounding suburban school districts.14 The Chief Justice, however, averred that both of the "findings"
of the lower courts as to "white flight" were internally inconsistent" as
42 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052.

See id.; see also Milliken 11, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977).
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052. James Coleman first proffered the concept of
"white flight" in the mid-1970s. See Goedert, supra note 11, at 1878. Coleman's theory
'43
'44

rested on the principle that whites facing the possibility of school desegregation would
tend to leave the inner-city for the suburbs in large numbers. See id. This exodus would
hinder any meaningful possibility of effective desegregation because it would leave inner
city schools more racially identifiable and reduce the tax base, thereby decreasing the financial resources available to the school districts. See id. Coleman acknowledged that
there were other factors besides desegregation that influenced the mass departure to the
suburbs, but noted that the present means by which school districts were being desegregated was augmenting the problem rather than decreasing it. See id. n.63. Critics of the
"white flight" theory point out that the process of suburbanization has been happening
since the early 1900s. See id. at 1878. These critics contend that the residential relocation of urban whites occurs not because of desegregation efforts but, rather, because of
the desires of individuals to be closer to their jobs, to have additional property, and to live
in a cleaner environment. See id.; Orfield, supra note 10, at 831 (stating that during the
past two generations, whites have increasingly supported school integration, and residential choices may be a result of white resistance to predominantly minority schools with
high poverty rates and social problems instead of racial isolationism).
Some scholars have commented that implementing interdistrict relief to mitigate
"white flight" is a "logically attractive position." See Goedert, supra note 11, at 1879.
If desegregation efforts within an urban area are likely to cause "white flight", an obvious way to prevent the exodus is to increase the number of whites included within the
reach of the remedy by embracing the surrounding areas within the desegregation plan.
See id.
'45 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052. The Court traced the history of segregation within
Missouri which mandated segregated schools prior to 1954. See id. at 2052 n.6. In 1954
the State's Attorney General declared this official policy unenforceable after the decision
in Brown 1. See id. The following school year, 18.9% of the district's students were African-American. See id. The black population of the KCMSD steadily rose to 30% in the
1961-1962 academic year; 40% during the 1965-1966 school year; and 60% in the 19751976 academic year. See id. The KCMSD instituted the 6C desegregation plan to
achieve a minimum minority student population of 30%. See id. Since the 6C desegregation plan was implemented until 1986, enrollment in the KCMSD has decreased 30%
and, specifically, white enrollment was down 44%. See id.
146 See id. at 2052. The majority pinpointed the discussion of this issue by the lower
courts. See id. n.7. The Court examined the lower courts' refusals to consider this constitutional violation interdistrict in nature with future findings of the appellate court that
stated that "white flight" was caused by the African-American student majority in the
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well as in conflict with the typical presumption that "white fight" may be
a consequence of desegregation, not from de jure segregation. 47 Concluding, the majority observed that the record failed to sustain the district
court's reliance on "white flight" as a reason for a legitimate expansion
of the court's intradistrict remedial power through the goal of
"desegregative attractiveness". 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed the respondents' argument that
the district court had only examined the culpability of the adjoining
school districts.149 The majority noted that the reach of the remedial order was much broader encompassing whether the neighboring school
districts infringed the Constitution and whether interdistrict segregative
effects were present."' Thus, the majority observed that the district court
made specific findings that refuted the existence of current significant effects which led to the lower court's conclusion that the test of Milliken I
had not been met."'
district schools which was blamed on the KCMSD's and the State's constitutional violations. See id.
147 See id. Substantial evidence was presented at the hearing as to the liability issue
that many residents within the KCMSD relocated to the suburbs due to the district's attempt to integrate its schools. See id. n.8; see also U.S. v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of
Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (acknowledging that "white flight" may occur because
of the implementation of a desegregation remedy). Contra Orfield, supra note 10, at 827
(criticizing courts for blaming "white flight" on desegregation and using this as a means
for ending desegregation orders when courts have failed to consider that possibly the limits on remedial authority may have made continuous desegregation impossible).
'48 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2053; Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746; see also Dayton I,
433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (showing failed to sustain remedy as necessary to "eliminate all
vestiges of segregation"). Citing Freeman v. Pitts, the Court professed that in a school
case the remains of segregation with which the law is concerned possibly may be intangible and subtle; however, these vestiges of segregation still must be actual and be causally
linked to the de jure infraction being redressed. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2053 (quoting
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992)).
149 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 672
(8th Cir 1986)).
'" See id. at 2052-53 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir
1986)). The majority pointed out that the district court's order stated that only one district
was affected, the KCMSD, and this dictated that the remedy be limited solely to that system. See id. (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir 1986)).
'1 See id. at 2053 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir. 1986)
(affirming by a divided court the findings of the district court and conclusion that no interdistrict violation or effect was found)). Chief Justice Rehnquist commented that Justice
Souter in dissent construed the Eighth Circuit's findings to show that the constitutional
violations of the KCMSD and the State had not resulted in segregated neighboring school
districts. See id. n.9. The Chief Justice clarified that the Eighth Circuit would not have
reached this question because the present class of plaintiffs before the court, present and
future KCMSD pupils, would not have standing to challenge segregatory practices within
the adjoining school districts. See id.; cf Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992) (setting forth the three elements comprising the constitutional minimum
standing requirements). Thus, the majority stated that the Eighth Circuit meant exactly
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The Chief Justice proceeded to address Justice Souter's claims that
the Court's holding effectively overruled Hills v. Gautreaux.152 Chief
Justice Rehnquist found the decisions to be consistent and restated the
Milliken I principle that a district court exceeds the scope of its remedial
power by attempting to remedy an intradistrict violation that has not resulted in significant interdistrict effects with a remedy having an interdistrict purpose.153 The majority asserted that this conclusion followed
immediately from Milliken II where the Court reaffirmed the basic principle that a federal court order surpasses appropriate limits if its goal is
to abolish a condition that is not in contravention with the Constitution or
fails to flow from such violation."S
The Chief Justice concluded that the district court's goal of
"desegregative attractiveness" could not be reconciled with precedent
that limits a district court's remedial power.15 The Court reasoned that
the lower court's rationale that the greater the amount spent per student
in the KCMSD, the more likely that an unknown amount of non-minority
pupils not currently attending KCMSD's schools would enroll, was not
what was said: the Milliken I requirements were not fulfilled because the district court's
findings annul current significant interdistrict effects. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2053 n.9
(quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir. 1986)).
1s2 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2053.
In Gautreaux, the Court found that HUD along
with a local housing agency had participated in implementing and preserving a racially
segregated public housing program. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 287-91
(1976). The Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals had ordered the establishment
of a comprehensive area plan to remedy the violation. See id. at 291. The Court granted
certiorari to consider, in light of Milliken 1, if interdistrict relief was permissible without a
finding of an interdistrict violation. See id. at 292. The majority found that the relevant
geographic area containing the plaintiffs' housing alternatives was the Chicago housing
market, not simply the Chicago city limits. See id. at 299. Therefore, the Court concluded that a metropolitan-wide remedy was not prohibited as a matter of law. See id. at
306. The Court did not require the district court to expose HUD to a remedy exceeding
the geographical or political limits of its violation. See id. Rather, the Court stressed that
the holding should not be read as mandating a metropolitan-area order. See id. The
Court reversed the court of appeals' fact-finding that would have required a metropolitanarea remedy and remanded the case to the district court to obtain further evidence and
engage in additional consideration of the appropriateness of metropolitan-area relief. See
id.
"' See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45
(1974)).
"" See id. at 2054 (quoting Milliken 1I, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)). The Court also
briefly addressed the point emphasized in Milliken 11 that federal courts, in adherence to
constitutional principles, must consider the interests of local and state authorities in overseeing their own affairs when devising a remedy. See id. at 2052 (quoting Milliken I1,
433 U.S. at 280-81); supra note 111 (providing further support for local control of
school districts). The Court differentiated Gautreaux, which included the imposition of a
order upon a federal agency, from Milliken I1, which'raised federalism concerns implicated when a federal court imposes a remedial order on a state. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at
2054; Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
' See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054.

1997]

NOTE

1691

subject to any objective limitation." The majority further noted that the
goal of "desegregative attractiveness" had been used as a "hook on
improving the overall quality of
which to hang" new policies regarding
15 7
KCMSD.
the
within
education
Also acknowledging that there was no timetable as to the length of
the district court's involvement, the majority enunciated that each additional program mandated by the district court ensured the lower court's
continued involvement."" Each new program offered to enhance the
"desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD, the majority observed,
has been financed by the State, making the KCMSD increasingly more
dependent on additional State funding as well as on continued supervision
by the court to ensure that such funding is provided. 5 The Court
stressed that this conflicted with the principle that local control over education is an important national tradition" and, therefore, a district court
must endeavor to restore control of a school system to state and local
authorities. 6 ' Concluding, the Court stated that because the goal of
"desegregative attractiveness" had caused numerous imponderables and
was so far removed from eradicating the racial identifiableness of the
KCMSD's schools, the pursuit of this goal exceeded the district court's
broad discretion." 6 The majority held that the district court's order requiring salary increases, based on remedying the remains of segregation
by increasing the "desegregative attractiveness" of the KCMSD, was too
distant from the permissible implementation of an acceptable means to
correct previous legally mandated segregation."3
The majority, relying on similar considerations, rejected the district
court's order mandating continued State funding of quality education
programs because of inadequate student achievement levels." 6 The ma-

1
See id.; cf Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280 (requiring the remedial order to be fashioned to the extent practicable to return the individuals who have been subject to discriminatory actions to the place they would have occupied without such conduct). The
Court interpreted this reasoning to mean that every increased expenditure for teachers,
staff, books, or buildings would help to make the KCMSD more attractive to nonminority students which would hopefully encourage those non-minority students to enroll.
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054.
157 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052 (citing Jenkins ll, 495 U.S. 33, 76 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).

"" See id. at 2054.

"9 See id.
'60See id.(citing Dayton 1, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)).
161See id.; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237, 247 (1971).
'62 See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2055.
3 See id.; Milliken II,433 U.S. at 280.
'4 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
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jority clarified that the State had not asked the Court to declare that the
quality education programs had achieved partial unitary status." Rather,
the Court noted that the State challenged the requirement that it continue
to indefinitely fund the quality education programs until national averages
were achieved." 6 The Court enunciated that review of this issue was
needlessly complicated by the lack of findings by the district court in the
order requiring the continued funding of the quality education programs.167 The Chief Justice commented that the court of appeals, while
recognizing that in the determination of partial unitary status careful factfinding and thorough recordation of findings must be made, did not remand the case to the district court."u Instead, the Eighth Circuit attempted, the majority noted, to build a sufficient record from the district
69
court's comments from the bench and from the lower court's orders.1
Chief Justice Rehnquist professed that the court of appeals incorrectly relied on one order of the district court which stated that the KCMSD had
failed to attain its maximum potential because the KCMSD was still equal
to or below national averages at many grade levels." 7 The majority declared that this was not the correct test to use to decide whether a previously segregated school district had attained partial unitary status."7 ' The
Court set forth that the basic responsibility of a district court is to determine whether the decrease in achievement by minority pupils caused by
prior de jure segregation has been eliminated to the extent practicable." r
Based upon precedent, the majority maintained, the KCMSD and the
State were entitled to explicit statements of their respective responsibilities under a desegregation decree. " The Chief Justice asserted that although the district court found that segregation caused a system-wide decrease in achievement within the KCMSD,7 4 it had failed to identify the
incremental effect segregation actually had on African-American student

See id.
See id. The State assumed that the requirement of significant education improvement in both teaching and facilities may originally have been justified, but its unlimited
extension was not. See id.
16 See id.; see also Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4 (June 17, 1992)
'6 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
169 See id.; supra note 36 and accompanying text (providing the Eighth Circuit's findings regarding partial unitary status).
170 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
17, See id.; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell,
1'6
'6

498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).
'72

See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.

'* See id. at 2055 (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246).
17 See id. (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (1985), aff'd as modi-

fied, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986)).
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achievement
levels or the definite goals of the quality education pro175

grams.
The Chief Justice articulated that the district court must apply the
three-part test set forth in Freeman v. Pitts when reconsidering this order.176 The majority noted that the district court upon remand should
take into account that the State's involvement in the quality education
program has been limited to the financing, not the execution, of those
programs.'" The district court, the Court professed, should sharply

limit, if not do away with, reliance on improved achievement on test
scores because all parties concur that this was irrelevant in attaining partial unitary status as to the quality education programs."' Noting that
numerous external factors beyond the control of the KCMSD and the

State may affect minority student achievement, the Court insisted that as
long as the external factors were not caused by segregation, they should

not play a part in the remedial calculus."

9

The majority commented that

requiring the attainment of academic goals with no connection to the effects of segregation would unnecessarily delay the restoration of local
control over the KCMSD.'"
The Court pointed out that the district court should have taken into
account that many of the objectives of the quality education plan had been
achieved, noting that the KCMSD contained buildings and opportunities
presently unavailable at any other school in the country.'
The majority
observed that KCMSD schools had obtained a AAA rating eight years

ago, and that during seven of those years the current remedial programs
had been in effect."s The Court thus maintained that minority students in

175 See id.; cf Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 420 (stating that a district court is to determine
the additional segregative consequence the constitutional infringement had on the present
racial make-up of the school district's enrollment as compared to the distribution if no
constitutional violation had occurred). The Court also pointed out that the goal of obtaining "desegregative attractiveness" no longer provided support for the quality education programs. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055 n.10; supra text accompanying note 143.
176 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055. For a more detailed discussion of Freeman, see
supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
'7
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
'7s See id.
'79 See id. at 2055-56; Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434
(1976); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971).
18oJenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056.
"i' See id. The Court analogized that in education, as in economics, a "rising tide lifts
all boats" but furthered that the quality education programs should be fashioned to correct
the injuries sustained by the victims of previous de jure segregation. See id.
182 See id. The AAA rating is awarded by the State Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education upon consideration of a set list of criteria which reflects the ability
of a school system to furnish the resources needed to provide an educational program
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levels up through grade seven in the KCMSD have continuously attended
AAA-rated schools." The Chief Justice emphasized that minority students who at one time attended schools rated below the AAA level have
subsequently attended remedial education programs for up to seven

years. 184
In conclusion, the majority reminded the district court that on remand the end purpose should not be solely to correct the violation to the
extent possible but, also, to restore control of a school system functioning in adherence to constitutional principles to state and local authorities.' " Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of
partial unitary status of the KCMSD consistent with the majority's opinion. "
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, began by rejecting the
State's argument that the appropriateness of the district court's remedial
plan was correctly included in the question of whether achievement by
students was a proper indicator of partial unitary status.'"
Justice
O'Connor, however, recognized that the State also challenged the district
court's order requiring salary increases for virtually all KCMSD employees based on improving the "desegregative attractiveness" of the district. 88 The Justice asserted that included within this challenge, the State
asked the Court to determine if the district court's order followed precedent that dictates that the scope and nature of the remedy address the underlying constitutional violation."
Thus, the Justice promulgated that
the State not only inquired as to whether salary increases were a proper
way to attain the district court's objective of "desegregative attractiveness" but, also, whether that objective related to the underlying constitutional violation." ° The Justice reasoned that the appropriateness of
meeting the basic needs of its students. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26
(W.D. Mo. 1985).
"8 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056.
184 See id.
185See id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)). But see Simon, supra note 12, at 697-702 (stating that local autonomy should be considered in the formulation of the remedy, but continued emphasis on local autonomy in the implementation and
dissolution phase of the remedial plan is misplaced).
18 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056.
187 See id.at 2056 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor declared that simply
because it was necessary to answer one inquiry before another did not protect the first
question from Rule 14.1(a). See id. (quoting Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
115 S. Ct. 961, 977 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)); supra note 90 (discussing Supreme Court Rule 14.1(a)).
"g See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2056 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
189 See id.
'9oSee id.
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"desegregative attractiveness" as a remedial goal was not just an issue to
be decided before the clearly presented question"'1 but, rather, was an issue included in the question itself."9 Justice O'Connor continued that the
plain language of the question presented coupled with the State's brief
provided notice of the issue to the respondents."
The Justice next insisted that the majority's analysis comports with
the Court's decision in Hills v. Gautreaux.1 Justice O'Connor also addressed the dissent's interpretation of an "intradistrict violation", dismissing it as a "semantic distinction."9' The correct interpretation of an
intradistrict violation, Justice O'Connor stated, did not focus on whether
the violation produced any effects on surrounding districts but whether
the violation caused "significant segregative effects" beyond the district. " ' The Justice emphasized that upon affirming the district court's
initial remedial order, the Eighth Circuit specifically noted that the lower
court had examined and rejected whether the adjoining school districts
were constitutional violators and whether significant segregative effects
were present." 9 The Justice concluded that the lower courts' holdings
clearly indicated that there was no interdistrict violation justifying the
191See id. (citing Lebron, 115 S.Ct. at 966).
'9 See id.
"3 See Jenkins, 115

S.Ct. at 2056 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
See id.at 2057 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor emphasized that
footnote eleven, which reversed the finding by the court of appeals that possibly an interdistrict violation or the existence of interdistrict segregative effects may have been present, must be read in context. See id. at 2058 (O'Connor, J.,concurring) (citing Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n.ll (1976)). The Justice noted that the dissent argued that this
holding implied a suggestion that district boundaries may be crossed even without a
showing of interdistrict segregative effects. See id. Justice O'Connor, however, maintained that the Court only rejected the petitioners' contention that the mandated metropolitan-wide remedy was impermissible. See id. The Justice continued that the court of
appeals went too far in the opposite direction by suggesting that the lower court must consider metropolitan-wide relief based on the fulfillment of the Milliken I test. See id. The
Justice observed that the Court reversed the appellate court's findings so as to preserve
the fact finding function of the district court and to allow the lower court to exercise discretion accordingly. See id. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court repeated the
Milliken I requirement of interdistrict segregative effects within a different district to support an interdistrict remedy and held that the appellate court's unsupported speculation
failed to reach the level of demonstration required. See id.(quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
at 295 n. 11).
195 See id.
at 2059 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor commented that the
district court had classified the constitutional violation as intradistrict because it had not
caused segregation outside of the KCMSD and the surrounding school districts had not
participated in the violation. See id.The Justice explained that the district court had not
conveyed the impression that the violation had produced no effects of any type beyond
the district. See id.
"9 See id.
(citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)).
194

1

See id.
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The Justice also briefly

discussed Justice Souter's argument that the district court narrowly inter-

preted which effects were segregative."'

Justice O'Connor emphasized

that although the violation had segregative effects on the KCMSD, the

effects it had on the surrounding school districts did not justify interdistrict relief because they were not segregative.2
Justice O'Connor averred that the district court's orders should have
been fashioned to place African-American students on par with white
KCMSD students. 1 If reestablishing the KCMSD to unitary status
would draw white students into the district, the Justice professed that this

reversal of "white flight" would not be of legal consequence.'
The
Justice, however, stressed that the district court's goal of "desegregative
attractiveness" to reverse the effects of "white flight," no matter how
troubling, was impermissible because the exodus was not the direct result
of the constitutional violation.'

Concluding, Justice O'Connor recognized that unfortunately numerous factors may cause various types of discrimination but stated that Article III of the Constitution limits judicial intervention to cases involving
constitutional violations.'
The Justice then affirmed the principle that
the type of desegregation relief is dictated by the nature and breadth of
the constitutional violation. 5
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority's treatment of the two
remedial issues submitted for review but wrote separately to comment on

'9 See id.

See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2059 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See id.
2'oSee id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
m See id.
2
See id. The Justice professed that whether "white flight" was a result of segregation or desegregation, the finding that the KCMSD was racially segregated and that there
was neither an interdistrict violation nor a significant interdistrict effect foreclosed the
possibility of a remedy crossing district lines. See id.
2
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). The Justice recognized that Congress is empowered with the ability to determine whether legislation is necessary to ensure that the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment are enjoyed by all,
while federal courts hold no such license and must always function within their limited
judicial role. See id. Article III of the Constitution specifically sets forth that federal
court jurisdiction extends "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority". U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
20 See Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice also noted
that the majority was correct in only reviewing the propriety of the order mandating salary increases and refraining from addressing the permissibility of all the other remedies
ordered by the district court. See id.
'99
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The Justice stated that the mere existence

of one-race schools was insufficient to charge the State with a segregative

policy.

7

Justice Thomas continued that without a finding of intentional

State action, the district court improperly relied upon the proposition that

racial imbalances were unconstitutional to anchor the liability of the
State.2 "8 The Justice also stressed that a school that is comprised of a
majority of African-American students is not necessarily inferior.' Justice Thomas observed that the goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to
guarantee that all individuals are treated equally
by the State regardless of
10

their race, not to require strict race-mixing.

Justice Thomas next commented that the Court has given federal

courts much freedom in remedying problems that have not been adequately addressed by government policies."' The Justice insisted that it
is time for the Court to stop ignoring constitutional principles like federalism 2 or the separation of powers when attempting to reform the
206

See id. at 2062 (Thomas, J.,concurring).

mo See id; cases cited supra note 128. The Justice noted that the continuing racial
isolation in school populations following the end of de jure segregation may well be the
result of voluntary housing preferences or other private decisions. See Jenkins, 115 S.
Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J.,concurring). The district court, Justice Thomas pointed out, still
rested the State's liability on its previously imposed segregative policies before 1954, and
its failure to fulfill its affirmative duty of dissembling the dual school system after 1954.
See id.
2m See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J.,concurring).
2o9See id. at 2064 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Justice stated that the district court's
willingness to accept stereotypes regarding the inferiority of a black institution and the
inability of blacks to succeed without the benefit of white company resulted from a misreading of Brown 1. See id. In Brown 1, the Court acknowledged many psychological
and sociological studies claiming to demonstrate that de jure segregation injured black
students by creating "a feeling of inferiority" in them. See id.The Justice commented
that the district court cited this passage in Brown I to strengthen the assertion that mandatory segregation is inherently unequal and is harmful to self esteem. See id. Justice
Thomas asserted that the district court misunderstood Brown L See id. Justice Thomas
averred that Brown I did not state that racially isolated educational institutions were intrinsically inferior. See id. The harm that the Court noted, the Justice observed, was
connected to de jure and not de facto segregation. See id.at 2064-65. (Thomas, J., concurring). The Justice articulated that "black schools can function as the center and symbol of black communities, and provide examples of independent black leadership, success, and achievement." Id.at 2065 (Thomas, J.,concurring); see also Finley, supra
note 25, at 130 (highlighting the usefulness of African-American colleges in the education
of victims of discrimination).
210 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2066 (Thomas, J., concurring); supra note 26 (setting
forth the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
211 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2066 (Thomas, J., concurring).
212See id. The Justice professed that the Court previously held that education is primarily the responsibility of the States. See id.at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); supra note 111 lending
further support to this proposition. The principle of federalism is derived from the Tenth
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schools.2 13 Additionally, Justice Thomas stated that there was no history
of federal courts possessing broad remedial power, and that the courts
should 'sparingly impose equitable remedies pursuant to clear rules to restore predictability to the law and to ensure that constitutional remedies
are aimed at those who have been injured." 4 The Justice concluded by
articulating that the federal courts should not use racial balance as a pretext for resolving social problems that fail to transgress constitutional
principles.215
In the principal dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, began by challenging the Court's decision to include the propriety of the district court's magnet school order along with
the two court orders specifically granted review." 6 Justice Souter argued
that this issue had not been accepted for review, had not been necessary
to resolve in deciding the specific questions accepted for consideration,
and had been rejected for review when presented in an earlier petition for

Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X. When the States granted the delegated powers to the federal
government, those powers were limited both in scope and in the way in which they could
be used. See Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REv. 239, 247 (1995); see also Honorable
Sven Erik Holmes, Introduction: The October 1994 Supreme Court Term, 31 TULSA L.J.
421, 422-23 (1996) (asserting that the Court's decisions concerning race appear to be
moving toward the limited ability of government to deal with these problems which is directly related to the Court's federalism decisions during this same term).
2"3 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2066 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas conceded that although this case did not entail judicial encroachment upon another branch of
government's power, nonetheless, separation of powers principles should apply. See id.
at 2070-71 (Thomas, J., concurring). One author has stated that although Justice Thomas's assertion is logically and historically proper, it does not comport with the Court's
own declarations. See Leading Cases, supra note 212, at 244 n.49, 247 n.71 (1995)
(noting that in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) a plurality agreed with the Court's
prior holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) that the political question doctrine
fails to protect the states and added that the separation of powers principle similarly does
not apply to the federal courts' relationship to the States); cf. id. at 246 (stating that when
federal courts surpass solely remedying constitutional violations, they remove decisionmaking authority from the democratic branches in the absence of a constitutional mandate
to do so which violates the separation of powers). Although precedent shows that principles of the separation of powers doctrine do not apply to the relationship between the federal courts and the states, "the Constitution's structural and textual limits on judicial
authority support Justice Thomas's assertion in Missouri v. Jenkins that 'what the federal
courts cannot do at the federal level they cannot do against the States.'" Id. at 247
(quoting Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
214 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2067-71 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas expressed that the dissent's acceptance of the district court order implementing salary increases typifies the Court's failure to put limits on the federal courts' equitable remedial
power. See id. at 2071 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2' See id. at 2073 (Thomas, J., concurring).
216 See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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certiorari." 7 The Justice criticized the majority's willingness to reach
this broader issue because the respondents were unaware that a fundamental premise of a part of the district court's remedial decree was to be
the focus of the case.2"' Thus, Justice Souter contended that the respondents were not sufficiently prepared to address the foundational issue.219
The dissent asserted that the Court effectively overruled twenty years of
217

See id. The State previously had challenged the district court's remedial order im-

plementing magnet schools and the order requiring capital improvements, claiming that
the district court was using an interdistrict remedy to correct an intradistrict violation.
See id. at 2075-76 (Souter, J., dissenting). The court of appeals rejected the State's
charges and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1989. See id. at 2076 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The State's petition asked the Court to review the propriety of the district
court's ordering property tax increases to cover the costs of the remedial program, and
the permissibility of the magnet school program which was the foundation of the district
court's desegregation plan. See id. The Supreme Court accepted the taxation question
and held that although the district court could not directly impose the tax increase, it
could mandate that the KCMSD tax property at an appropriate rate which would enable
the district to cover the costs of its share of the desegregation decree. See id. The Court
denied certiorari on the claim questioning the magnet school program. See id. Justice
Souter commented that if the Court had accepted this issue for review, the Court could
have also decided whether the magnet school program exceeded the boundaries of the
district court's equitable discretion to remedy the underlying constitutional violation. See
id. Justice Souter emphasized that the State did not brief this issue when it submitted its
1994 petition for certiorari to the Court in this case. See id.
218 See id. at 2073-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
219 See id. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter propounded that Supreme
Court Rule 14.1 precluded review of the broader issue of the permissibility of the magnet
school program that was not included in the petition for certiorari. See id. at 2076
(Souter, J., dissenting). Rule 14.1, the Justice continued, sets forth that only questions
specifically stated or fairly included in the petition will be addressed by the Court. See
id. Although the majority found this broader issue to be "fairly included" in the State's
salary question, Justice Souter disagreed and averred that the Court could decide the testscore and salary issues without considering the propriety of the magnet school element of
the underlying remedial scheme. See id at 2077 (Souter, J., dissenting). The State also
conceded that the Court could answer the questions submitted to and accepted by the
Court without deciding the permissibility of the magnet school plan. See id. Therefore,
the dissent reasoned that this should terminate the discussion of this issue. See id. The
Justice also noted that even if it was proper for the Court to entertain the foundational issue under Rule 14.1, the critical question is whether the Court may decide that issue
without clear warning, especially when the Court had declined to address this issue previously. See id.; Brubaker, supra note 27, at 589 (criticizing the broad reading of Rule
14.1 and the majority's willingness to disprove the magnet school plan that previously in
1990 had sustained the Court's order to impose a tax, as demonstrating a strong judicial
activism from the conservative Justices).
Justice Souter clarified that the position that the Justice previously had taken in Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993), was not inconsistent with the
position that the dissent now espoused. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2077 n.2 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter stated that in Bray the question was fairly included within the
question presented and, therefore, properly addressed by the Court. See id. Justice
Souter emphasized that the Bray Court had not previously denied certiorari of the issue in
question as had occurred in the present case. See id.
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constitutional precedent by considering an issue that was not addressed in
argument and by not giving adequate notice to the parties of the issue to

be decided.'
The dissent next addressed the test score issue and found that neither
the district court nor the Eighth Circuit had relied on the attainment of
national averages in denying the State's request for a declaration of partial unitary status.22' Rather, Justice Souter observed, the Eighth Circuit
had not found that the KCMSD had reached partial unitary status simply
because the State had failed to make the showing necessary for that relief."
As to the second issue before the Court, Justice Souter expounded

that the majority overlooked that the district courthad based the orders of
salary increases on two complementary but distinct rationales. '
The
dissent observed that the district court had considered salary increases for
KCMSD employees to be an important element in helping to reverse the
system-wide decrease in student achievement caused by the segregated
Justice Souter criticized the majority for
system within the KCMSD.'
220See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2' See id. at 2078 (Souter, J.,dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the June 17,
1992 order relevant to the test score question had not mentioned achieving national averages in test scores and had not addressed the issue of partial unitary status. See id. The
test score reference was found in a subsequent district court order dated April 16, 1993
which was not under review Justice Souter added. See id. The dissent noted that the discussion of student achievement levels was quoted in the Eighth Circuit's opinion affirming
the June 17, 1992 order which had canvassed subsequent orders of the district court, and
included the lower court's finding of fact that the KCMSD had not reached national averages at many grade levels. See id.Justice Souter stressed that neither the district court
nor the court of appeals had required attainment of certain student achievement levels before unitary status was declared. See id.
222See id. at 2078-79 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent stated the three-part test set
forth in Freeman v. Pills, which governmental entities asking for partial relief from a desegregation order are to follow, governed this determination. See id.at 2079 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The dissent explained that it is the burden of the constitutional violator to
show that these Freeman conditions exist, and observed that the State failed to allege its
conformity with two of the three conditions. See id.
Justice Souter recognized that test scores will be relevant in determining if the remedial programs have eliminated to the extent practicable vestiges of prior segregation on
student achievement levels. See id. at 2080-81 (Souter, J., dissenting); Freeman, 503
U.S. at 483 (considering student achievement levels of African-American students as one
factor in determining if previously segregated system has reached unitary status). The
Justice insisted that a more detailed record is needed in order for the district court upon
remand to make an informed decision on this issue. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2081
(Souter, J., dissenting).
223 Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting).
224 See id. at 2081 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter professed that although
some may question extending salary increases to noninstruetional employees, it,
is no less
appropriate to implement salary increases for maintenance and administrative personnel,
as the district court found that such employees are vital to a successful desegregation ef-
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failing to consider this reason and instead solely basing the Court's rejection of salary increases on the goal of attracting non-minority students
into KCMSD schools.'
Justice Souter commented that to the extent the
district court, on remand, finds the salary orders to be supported by reference solely to the quality of education, the court should not be precluded from permitting the salary orders to remain in effect.'
Next, Justice Souter impugned the majority's interpretation of an
"intradistrict violation" as differing from the district court's meaning of
the term.'
The Court, the dissent declared, assumed that the segregatory effects were only within the KCMSD and, therefore, argued that an
interdistrict remedy was forbidden.'
Justice Souter then noted that the
majority found that the lower courts were in error when they had considered the reversal of those effects as an appropriate outlay of equitable
power to eliminate, to the extent practicable, any lingering remains of the
previously segregated system.'
Justice Souter stressed that the Court
did not dispute the lower courts' interpretation of the facts; and on the
limited record before the Court, the dissent propounded that the majority's factual assumption was at least a questionable basis for eliminating
one principal foundation of the desegregation order.' °
The dissent recognized that the lower courts had agreed that the
neighboring school districts had not participated in activity contributing
to segregation within the KCMSD 31 and that the constitutional violations
perpetrated by the State and the KCMSD had not caused significant segregative effects in adjoining districts. 2 Based on these findings, Justice
Souter reasoned that the district court had concluded that the violation
was intradistrict, therefore denying the consolidation of the surrounding
school districts with the KCMSD. 33 Justice Souter insisted that there
was no discrepancy between the lower courts' findings and the plausibilfort because they maintain deteriorating facilities. See id. at 2082 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Both lower courts, the dissent added, found and affirmed that the salary increase for
teachers was allowed because in order to correct the educational deficits resulting from
the previously segregated system in the KCMSD, the individuals responsible for implementing the remedial program must be the highest quality personnel reasonably attainable. See id.
225 See id. at 2082-83 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227 See id.; Brubaker, supra note 27, at 590 (claiming that the Court interpreted the
term "interdistrict" to denote something unrecognizable).
' See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting).
229 See id. at 2083-84 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2" See id. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2" See id.
232 See id. The surrounding suburban districts have all operated as unitary districts
since Brown. See id.
23 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ity that the violations of the State and the KCMSD had resulted in sig-

nificant non-segregative effects in the surrounding school districts that
produced greater segregation within the KCMSD. 2
The dissent declared that the lower courts had concurred in finding

that the previously imposed system of segregation had led to "white

flight." 5 Although the results of "white flight" would not have caused
segregation within the neighboring school districts that were maintained

in a unitary manner, Justice Souter stated that it represented an effect
crossing district borders.' The dissent attacked the majority's rejection
of the findings of'the district court that segregation had. led to "white
flight" because this rejection of a trial court's fact finding contradicted an
accepted norm of appellate procedure. 7 The dissent explained that the
Supreme Court is a court of law and cannot review findings of fact by the
lower courts without a very clear and exceptional showing of error."
Justice Souter contended that the Court failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstance and instead relied on an obscure contradiction 39 and
an arbitrary supposition' that "white flight" may follow desegregation,

not segregation.ul The Justice reiterated that all members of the Court
were at a disadvantage because factual issues had been resolved inde-

234

See id.

2" See id.
m See id.
237 See id.
2m See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949)).
23' See id. The dissent noted that the doubtful contradiction was claimed to exist between the lower court's findings that segregation caused "white flight", and the appellate
court's conclusion that the district court "made specific findings that negate current significant interdistrict effects." Id. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting). Upon reading the
Eighth Circuit's statement in context, Justice Souter stated that the contradiction disappeared and no tension existed between the findings of the two courts; while "white flight"
produced significant effects in neighboring school districts, those effects cannot be classified as segregative beyond the KCMSD, because the pupils now attended unitary school
districts. See id.
Justice Souter claimed that without the
240 See id. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
contradiction to rely on, the majority must depend upon the supposition that "white
flight" results from integration, not de jure segregation. See id. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent attacked the supposition and the distinction resting on the fact that
there was an absence of a break in the line of causation linking the consequences of desegregation with the effects of segregation. See id. Noting the majority's reliance on the
lower court's reference to evidence that integration resulted in "white flight". Justice
Souter posited that the Court relied on nothing inconsistent with the other findings of the
district court that segregation had initiated the flight. See id. Justice Souter declared that
the sole difference between the statements focused on the point at which the trial court
happened to examine the causal sequence. See id. at 2085-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
24 See id. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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pendent of the district court and without proper warning to the respondents 4 2
Justice Souter also contended that the majority opinion involved errors of law in interpreting both Milliken I and Hills v. Gautreaux.'2 The
dissent first addressed the Court's incorrect reading of an interdistrict
remedy as set forth in Milliken L2 Justice Souter professed that the MUliken I Court had not held that a remedy that considered conditions outside of the district where a constitutional violation had taken place was an
"interdistrict remedy" and, therefore, inappropriate without an
"interdistrict violation." - Justice Souter opined that the Milliken I
Court had emphasized the applicable equitable principles that govern remedial action in school desegregation cases' and had not precluded a
lower court from instituting a remedy with effects reaching beyond the
district of the constitutional harm when such remedial action was needed
to redress the harms resulting from the constitutional violation. 7 The
dissent repudiated the majority's understanding of Milliken I under which
a remedy with intended consequences on innocent adjoining districts cannot be forced upon a constitutional violator unless the underlying violation had caused segregative effects in the innocent district.2 ' The dissent
found that this interpretation equaled a redefinition of Milliken I and a
significant expansion of its stated limitation on permissible remedies for
prior segregation."
Additionally, the dissent claimed that the Court effectively overruled
Hills v. Gautreaux.' The Gautreaux Court, Justice Souter averred, held
that a district court may permissibly impose upon a governmental unit
guilty of enforcing segregative practices, even without effects on surrounding subdivisions, a remedy with intended consequences that extend
beyond the violator's own subdivision, so long as the order does not burden innocent governmental units that are free of segregative effects."'
The dissent clarified that although it was permissible to cross district

See id. at 2086 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2087, 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting).
24 See id. at 2087 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 745
(1974)). For a detailed discussion of Milliken I see footnotes 70-78 and accompanying
text.
241 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2087 (Souter, J., dissenting).
246 See id. (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 737-38).
247 See id. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting).
248 See id.
242
243

249

See id.

250 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra note 152 (providing
a brief discussion of Gautreaux).
25 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J. dissenting).
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lines, even without an interdistrict violation or effect, separate and independent school districts innocent of any violation could not be restrained

in the operation of their local school districts.32 Continuing the analysis,

the dissent professed that the magnet school program was included within

the reach of the district court's equitable power recognized in Gautreaux. 53 The dissent contended as in Gautreaux that the adjoining school
districts were not subject to any remedial duty because the burden of implementing the program rested entirely on the constitutional infringers,
the State, and the KCMSD.'

Justice Souter also reasoned that even if

the magnet program was based on "desegregative attractiveness", this
would not constitute an abuse of discretion because the order would still
be commensurate with the "nature and extent of constitutional violation." 5 The Justice again stressed that the majority's failure to grant
Gautreaux its due demonstrated the risks of addressing important and
complex questions without proper notice to the parties.'
252 See id. (quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296). The dissent distinguished Milliken I
from Gautreaux by focusing on the imposition of a remedy in Milliken I which divested
the innocent surrounding school districts of their autonomy. See id. at 2087-89 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that the Gautreaux Court's remedy was permitted
because a solution involving a wider metropolitan area was needed in order to properly
address the violation, and by imposing this remedy innocent governmental units were not
bound in any way. See id. at 2089 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent stressed that after
having found HUD in contravention of the Constitution, the lower court was responsible
for making every attempt to implement the methods needed to attain the most effective
relief, considering the situation and the suitable methods involved could encompass measures crossing the boundaries of the particular area containing the violation. See id.
(quoting Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 297).
253 See id.

" See id.
2" See id. (citing Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 300).
6 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter addressed Justice O'Connor's statement that the dissent put undue emphasis on Gautreaux's
footnote 11. See id. at 2090 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra note 194. The dissent interpreted Justice O'Connor's reading of Gautreaux to allow territorial transgression only
after showing that an intradistrict violation caused significant segregative effects. See
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2090 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent found that Justice
O'Connor's understanding of the Gautreaux Court's opinion only to reverse the findings
of the court of appeals as to the presence of significant interdistrict effects and to remand
the case solely to determine if such effects existed was an implausible reading. See id.
Justice Souter agreed that Gautreaux reiterated the significance of Milliken 's interdistrict
segregative effects, but only when related to the kind of relief involved in Milliken I
which concerned the imposition of remedial obligations upon innocent entities. See id.
(citing Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 294). The dissent stated that while Justice O'Connor focused on the GautreauxCourt's failure to order interdistrict relief directly, the question of
relief was more appropriately left to the district court. See id. Justice Souter concluded
by asserting that nowhere in Gautreaux did the Court hold that to validate an interdistrict
remedy, a district court would first have to find significant segregative effects crossing
the borders of the area found to have violated the Constitution. See id.
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In a brief dissent, Justice Ginsburg stressed that Missouri has had a

long history of segregation in the public schools.

7

Given Missouri's

pervasive and shameful history of segregation, Justice Ginsburg believed

that restraining the desegregation process now and in this way was an action which was both too soon and too swift.258

The role of law in society and whether it should be proactive or reactive is a topic of much debate. 259 In desegregation cases, however, it

seems as if the law has positive responsibilities to remedy social ills'
especially when the judges implementing the desegregation orders acknowledge the limited ability of a federal court to effectuate change when
the community involved in the order is resisting change."6 The social ill

to be remedied is not a general malady in racial relations but, rather, a
failed desegregation effort which at one time blatantly violated the Constitution, was never adequately remedied, and still continues to exist today. Little progressive movement on racial issues has been made by the
American population in the absence of concentrated political pressure.262
The general population usually has been satisfied by the status quo which
seems to have once again pacified the Supreme Court in Missouri v.
Jenkins.'
The Court previously has acknowledged that innovative methods

may be the most effective remedies in desegregation cases.'6

Addition-

ally, the Court has stressed that methods of experimentation must remain
257See id. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
m See id. Justice Ginsburg noted that the seven years court ordered remedial programs have been in effect is de minimis compared to the more than two hundred years of
official discrimination. See id.; see also Drinan, supra note 5, at 884 (asserting that
"from 1619 to 1954, for 335 years, we branded an entire race with the stamp of social
and genetic inferiority. It is not enough, after just thirty years of attempts at reparation,
to simply announce that society has been transformed.").
259 Compare, e.g., Robert L. Carter, De Facto School Segregation: An Examination
of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented, in DE FACTO SEGREGATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 28-57 (1965) (declaring that
the law has affirmative duties in society), with Charles J.Bloch, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Forbid De Facto Segregation?, in DE FACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
STRUGGLE FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 58-70 (1965) (proposing that the law should
react to the desires of society).
260See Carter, supra note 259, at 28-57. Some disagree with this view and claim that
the law should accept new elements of life only after communities have reasoned, through
experience, that the law must change. See Bloch, supra note 259 at 58-70.
261 See Flicker, supra note 9, at 373; see also Robert Anthony Watts, Shattered
Dreams and Nagging Doubts: The Declining Support Among Black Parents for School
Desegregation, 42 EMORY L.J. 891, 891-96 (describing the loss of support among African-Americans for desegregation efforts).
22 See Jack E. White, Why We Need to Raise Hell, TIME, Apr. 29, 1996, at 46.
Y See id.
' See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. 267, 283 (1977).
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available which permit creative remedial options in school desegregation
The dissent correctly comprehended that the school board
remedies.'
was acting in concert with the district court and both were doing no more
than complying with prior desegregation case law.' The desegregation
plan was.unique, implementing a system of strong academic curricula
through a magnet school program. 7 The dissent astutely noted two purposes supporting this magnet plan.' The plan hoped to attract students
attending private schools within the KCMSD as well as white students in

Additionally, the
the surrounding suburbs into the KCMSD schools.'
desegregation plan was instituted to improve the quality of education for
children within the KCMSD.'

This magnet plan served as an innovative

way to integrate a predominantly minority district without requiring the
much resisted actions of busing students long distances or redrawing
school district zones. Participation in the program was completely voluntary and the authority of the surrounding suburban school districts was
not compromised. Academic excellence was the impetus used to stimulate increased educational opportunities for all, but especially for the African-American students of the KCMSD who have attended predomi-

nantly one-race schools which were inferior to those of the surrounding
suburbs.

This desegregation program complied with the mandate set

forth in Green v. County Sch. Bd. that a plan be instituted that promises
realistically and promptly to work.27' The authorities involved attempted

to fashion an integration program which was convenient, workable, practicable, and possibly the only realistic chance of integrating the KCMSD
schools. 2' Although admittedly this area of law is muddled and confus-

m See United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 235 (1969).
The Court in Green v. County School Board stated:
There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there
is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter
must be assessed in light of the circumstances present and the options
available in each instance. It is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress
toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is incumbent upon the
district court to weigh that claim in light of the facts at hand and in light of
any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more promising in
their effectiveness.
Green, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
2M See, e.g., id.; Green, 391 U.S at 436-37.
7 See supra note 134 detailing the magnet school program of the KCMSD
20 See supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text
9 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
271 See Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
272 Many authorities argue that magnet school programs may be the only effective desegregation option available now. See David J.Armor, The Desegregation Dilemma, 109
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ing, this confusion has allowed the majority to rationalize its decision.
Communities must to the extent practicable make every effort to assure
that racially segregated schools become no more than matter of past his2n
tory.
Children of all races are the losers here. Integrated education is impossible due to demographic patterns leaving the inner-cities predominantly black. Although the immediate focus might more appropriately be
on increasing the quality of education provided in both the majority African-American schools and white schools" 4 this does not mean that attempts to effectively educate white and black students together should be
forgotten. For truly if this alone remains the goal of public education,
our children will once again be indoctrinated with the understanding that
separate but equal is equal.275
Megan E. Gula

HARv. L. REv. 1144, 1147 (1996) (book review); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition:
School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 778 (1986).

'73 See Montgomery County Bd. ofEduc., 395 U.S. at 231. Admittedly, the State can
voluntarily implement plans involving the mandatory interdistrict movement of students
which the court is without authority to order. See Beck, supra note 27, at 1036 n.46; supra note 87. Although possibly the only effective remedy remaining in the desegregation

arsenal, it likely will not be used by school districts that were never adequately desegregated and returned to racially identifiable schools soon after involvement ceased.
274 See Alfred A. Lindseth, A Different Perspective: A School Board Attorney's Viewpoint, 42 EMORY L.J. 879, 887 (1993).
275 See Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in School Desegre-

gation, 42 EMORY L.J. 863, 867 (1993).

